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Death in One Act:
The Case for Company Registration
"[T]he time has come for a fundamental conceptual change in the
scheme of regulation governing public offerings."'
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Securities Act of 19332 (Securities Act or 1933 Act) completes
its sixty-third year of existence, its future is more uncertain than at any
other time in its history. Although its core principles were once hailed
as "a permanent and integral part of our legal system,"3 the 1933 Act
now merits such descriptions as "obsolete"4 and its dictates are ad-
dressed in terms of "erosion."5 Now, the innovative "company registra-
tion" disclosure model, recently embraced by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation
and Regulatory Processes (Advisory Committee or Committee),6 may
very well signify the demise of the 1933 Act altogether.
The growth of capital markets, the rise of institutional investors, and
the advent of modem technology have created a fundamentally differ-
ent investing terrain than the one envisioned by the drafters of the Act
more than sixty years ago.7 Competition for capital has never been so
fierce. Modem companies, especially small businesses, struggle to raise
needed capital without incurring the transaction costs and liability risks
1. SECURTmEs AND ExcH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
CAPITAL FORMATION AND REGULATORY PROcEsSES, pt. II, at 2 (July 24, 1996) (visited
Nov. 23, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov> [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT].
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
3. See William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933,
43 YALE U. 171, 173 (1933).
4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the Securities Act of 1933 Obsolete? The SEC In-
creasingly Appears to Believe so But Has Not yet Adopted a Consistent Policy to
Replace It, NAT'L U., Sept. 4, 1995, at B4.
5. See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to
the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MicH. L. REv. 649, 702
(1995).
6. ADVISORY COMmITrEE REPORT, supra note 1.
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming
Debate over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1143, 1148-49 (1995).
involved in a typical 1933 Act public offering.8 More businesses than
ever are turning to private offerings and other statutory exemptions as
a means of circumventing the 1933 Act's high costs, often rendering the
Act an irrelevant obstacle to needed capital formation.'
Over the last thirty years, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Commission or SEC) has begun to acknowledge the increasing pres-
sures for change. Beginning with adoption of the integrated disclosure
system in 1980, the Commission has made some headway toward com-
bining the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act and the Exchange
Act of 19340 (1934 Act) to arrive at a coordinated, non-duplicative,
and less costly system of disclosure." Regulation S-K,' 2 adopted in
1982, itemized several areas of disclosure common to 1933 and 1934
Acts filings in an attempt to synthesize information provided by compa-
nies subject to both Acts. 3 Shelf registration emerged from the inte-
grated disclosure system as a way for issuers to go to the market more
efficiently and more often by relying on disclosures required under the
1934 Act.'
4
Company registration represents the culmination of the integrated
disclosure process and has been called "the ultimate ascendancy of
Exchange Act disclosure over that of the Securities Act." Company
registration would allow a seasoned securities issuer, subject to 1934
Act reporting, to offer and sell securities after a one-time registration of
all its authorized securities, thereby eliminating the need to register
each future issuance."
The time has come for fundamental change in the amount and meth-
ods of disclosure required from companies issuing securities in the
United States. This Comment will take the position that the Securities
Act of 1933 is outmoded and should be replaced with legislation imple-
menting, with some changes, the pilot company registration system pro-
posed by the Commission's Advisory Committee. In the alternative, the
8. See id.
9. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 45-57; see also Coffee,
supra note 7, at 1186 (noting that Rule 144A offerings have "soared" since the intro-
duction of equity shelf registration). The Supreme Court has partially reaffirmed this
conclusion by refusing to extend the strict and vicarious liability provisions of the
1933 Act to private placements, a fast-growing method for issuers to bypass tradition-
al 1933 Act registration. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1065 (1995).
10. Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
11. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1145.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-.915 (1996).
13. See id.
14. Id. § 230.415.
15. Margaret A. Bancroft, Responding to Gustafson- Company Registration and a
New Negligence Standard, INSIGHTS, July 1995, at 14, 15.
16. See ADVisORY COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 1, at iii.
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Advisory Committee should recommend that the Commission request
broadened exemptive authority from Congress in order to implement
most of the provisions of company registration through administrative
rulemaking. Part II presents a brief history of traditional disclosure
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 7 Part I examines the pressures that
resulted in the integrated disclosure system and the system's radical
shift away from transactional disclosure to continuous disclosure under
the 1934 Act'8 Part IV turns to the recent call for company registra-
tion, both by commentators proposing models of a new company regis-
tration system and by legislative and administrative reform efforts."
Part V analyzes the proposed model of company registration contained
in the Advisory Committee Report, which abandons traditional 1933 Act
disclosure in favor of a comprehensive registration and disclosure sys-
tem unified under the 1934 Act.2' Part VI critically analyzes key points
of the proposed system and offers some suggestions for improve-
ment." The Comment concludes by recommending a combination of
congressional legislation and administrative rulemaking in order to fully
implement a -company registration system.22 Company registration
would not only strike the best balance between efficient capital forma-
tion and investor protection but also would fulfill the true spirit of full
and fair disclosure envisioned by the 1933 Act.
f1. OVERVIEW OF THE 1933 AND 1934 AcTs
A. The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 was born in the aftermath of the Great
Stock Market Crash of 1929, a catastrophe brought about in large part
by widespread and massive investor fraud. Relatively unsophisticated
investors purchased millions of dollars of securities in the booming
market of the 1920s with virtually no hard information to evaluate the
17. See iftra notes 23-180 and accompanying text.
18. See iftra notes 181-343 and accompanying text.
19. See inft notes 344430 and accompanying text.
20. See iftra notes 431-549 and accompanying text.
21. See irfra notes 550-75 and accompanying text
22. See infra notes 576-77 and accompanying text.
23. See CHARLES C. JOHNSON, JR., CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 1-3
(1990). Half of the $50 billion in securities floated in the exchange markets during
the 1920s was worthless by 1933. Id. at 2; see H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
quality of the securities they were buying.24 These fraudulently floated
securities were a central force behind the 1929 crash and the resulting
poor condition of the nation's economy.'
Until 1933, securities regulation was left wholly to individual states.'I
In 1911, Kansas passed the nation's first "blue sky" laws, which required
both full disclosure by issuers and qualification based on "merit" or the
quality of the investment.27 Several states followed with similar stat-
utes, but these laws ended at the state borders; no coherent system of
federal legislation emerged to regulate interstate securities transactions
not covered by the blue sky laws.2 The result was an inconsistent
patchwork of state regulations with differing protections for investors
in each state-a system that was wholly ineffective in stemming the
fraud leading to the 1929 crash.' Thus, in response to increasing calls
for federal securities regulation, Congress, led by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, passed the Securities Act of 19 33 .'
The primary purpose of the 1933 Act is to provide "full and fair dis-
closure on the special occasion of a public offering."31 In short, the
1933 Act requires any company or underwriter making a public offering
of securities to disclose certain information to investors and prohibits
fraud in connection with the distribution of those securities. 32 Ade-
24. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 2; see H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2.
25. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 2. For a more detailed history of the factors lead-
ing up to the 1929 crash, see McHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE
NEW DEAL 29 (1970).
26. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 6 (2d
ed 1990).
27. Id. These laws became known as blue sky laws because their purpose was to
"protect the Kansas farmers against the industrialists' selling them a piece of the blue
sky." Id.
28. PARRISH, supra note 25, at 29.
29. ANNE M. KHADEmIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: THE POLmCS
OF EXPERTISE 24-25 (1992).
30. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 2; see H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933) (President
Roosevelt's message to Congress proposing federal securities legislation, dated March
29, 193).
31. Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L REV. 1340, 1340
(1966). In the 1930s, underwriters often took six months or more to market and sell
an offering, and Congress wrote the 1933 Act with this lengthy time frame in mind;
thus, it should not be surprising that the 1933 Act required such an exhaustive and
time-consuming issuer investigation prior to a public offering. See Bancroft, supra
note 15, at 14 n.2.
32. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL ET AL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 23, 59 (1995). Ac-
cording to Professor Frankfurtr, the 1933 Act differed from the state blue sky laws
in that it did not "'place the government's imprimatur upon securities. It is designed
merely to secure essential facts for the investor, not to substitute the government's
judgment for his own.'" JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 5 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The
Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 108).
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quate disclosure for SEC purposes requires (1) registration of the of-
fered securities with the SEC, and (2) distribution of a prospectus con-
taining essential disclosures about the issuer's finances, business, and
the offering itself to potential investors.' Once fied with the SEC in
Washington, D.C., the registration statement is available for public in-
spection.'
1. The Registration Statement and Prospectus
a. Structure of the registration statement: Parts I & H
Under section 5 of the 1933 Act,' every company making a public
offering of securities by way of interstate commerce or use of the mails
(absent an applicable exemption) must file a registration statement with
the SEC.' The registration statement is a long, detailed document that
reveals the company's management structure and financial condition, as
well as the purposes and uses of the funds raised by offering the securi-
ty.' For domestic issuers, Schedule A of the 1933 Act outlines the in-
formation they must include in the registration statement,' while Reg-
ulation C details the statement's proper form and mechanics. 9
The registration statement is composed of two parts: Part I, contain-
ing the prospectus, which will later be distributed to investors; and Part
33. BLOOMENTRAI supra note 32, at 59.
34. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 6.
35. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
36. 1 HAZEN, supra note 26, at 8.
37. Id.
38. 15 U.S.C., § 77aa (1994). Schedule A contains 32 items of information that the
issuer must disclose in the registration statement, all but five of which must be part
of the prospectus. Id. These items generally require the following disclosures: the
names, addresses, remuneration, and stock holdings of the issuer's directors, officers,
underwriters, and shareholders holding 10 percent or more of a class of the issuer's
stock; the character of the issuer's business; the issuer's capitalization; the prospec-
tive use of the funds to be raised in the offering; the price of the security; and the
details of any underwriting agreements concerning .the issue. Id. The Commission's
adoption of Regulation S-K and Forms S-1-2-3 have substantially modified, however,
some of the disclosures traditionally required under Schedule A. See infra notes 54-63
and accompanying text (discussing the different registration forms); btfra notes 198-
221 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation S-K).
39. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-.497 (1996). For example, Rules 403(a)-(c), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.403(a)-(c), specify the requisite paper type, paper size, and font, and Rule 420,
17 C.F.RY § 230.420, requires legible printing in the English language or with transla-
tions.
II, containing additional information not part of the prospectus filed
with the SEC, but kept available for public inspection.' Part I is com-
prised entirely of the prospectus, which is defined as any "notice, circu-
lar, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or tele-
vision, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any se-
curity."4 The prospectus is required to include "essential facts regard-
ing [the company's] business operations, financial condition, and man-
agement."42 It must disclose the expected use of the offering proceeds,
the methods for determining the offering price, the securities to be
registered under the statement, and the shareholders selling their hold-
ings in the offering.' Also, the prospectus details the issuer's business
itself, including its management and financial structure.4" Finally, and
most importantly, the prospectus must contain current audited financial
statements.45
Section 5 of the 1933 Act makes the prospectus the central selling
document between issuer and buyer, requiring the issuer to (1) deliver
the prospectus to purchasers prior to sale," and (2) refrain from solic-
iting purchasers by any means other than the preliminary prospectus
before the registration statement is declared effective.47 After the regis-
tration statement becomes effective and is reviewed by SEC staff, the
prospectus must be made available to both purchasers and any other
person offered the securities." The issuer must give a final prospectus,
40. 1 HAZEN, supra note 26, at 8.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
42. OFFICE OF SMALL Bus. POLICY, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, Q&A. SMALL Busi-
NESS AND THE SEC 8 (1994) [hereinafter Q&A. SMALL BusINESS AND THE SEC).
43. SECURITIES AND EXCH. COMM'N, FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES: A SYNOPSis
OF FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND AMEX, NYSE, AND NASD LISTING AND RE-
PORTING REQUIREMENTS 5 (1989) [hereinafter FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES]; see
infra notes 54-63 and 198-221 and accompanying text (discussing the content of regis-
tration statements in Forms S-1-2-3 and under Regulation S-K).
44. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 5; see itfra notes 54-63
and 198-221 and accompanying text (discussing content of registration statements in
forms S-1-2-3 and under Regulation S-K).
45. See FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 5. The form and
content of these financial statements are prescribed by Regulation S-X, while the
form and content of other disclosures are specified by Regulation S-K Id.; see inf'ra
notes 198-221 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation S-K).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3), 77e(b)(2) (1994). These provisions are commonly known as
the "prospectus delivery requirement." See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1151.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994). Soliciting such buyers before the issuer files the reg-
istration statement is known as "gun-jumping." See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1150;
inra notes 268-99 and accompanying text (discussing the section 5 gun-jumping re-
striction).
48. Q&A SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 8.
Once the registration statement has been filed but before its effective date,
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including all amendments, to each offeree of the company's securities
prior to sale.' Either at the start of the offering period or five days
after the effective date of the registration statement, whichever is later,
ten copies of the distributed prospectus must be filed with the SEC
before the registration statement can be used to sell the securities pub-
licly.50
Part II of the registration statement contains additional information
not included in the prospectus which the issuer must fie with the Com-
mission."' This information is elicited in "item-and-answer format" and
discloses indemnification issues, other issuance expenses, and any un-
registered securities the issuer has recently sold.' Part II may also
provide information that is not included in the prospectus but is needed
to render the registration statement, as a whole, "complete and not mis-
leading..5
b. Forms S-1-2-3
Registration under the 1933 Act is accomplished primarily through
one of three forms.' Issuers must use Form S-i if the company has
the (issuer] can distribute a preliminary or 'red herring' prospectus. This pro-
spectus, which does not include the offering price and underwriting commis-
sion, has a red ink legend [hence the term "red herring"] stating that the
registration statement is not yet effective and the securities cannot be sold.
FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 7.
49. Q&A. SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 8.
50. Id. The issuer must also file 10 copies of any changed prospectus, with five
copies of a cross-reference sheet Id.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. Part II also contains exhibits, which may include the articles of incorpora-
tion, the by-laws, any underwriting agreements, and stock option plans. Id. In addi-
tion, Part II must disclose all information required under Schedule A that was not in-
cluded in the prospectus. See supra note 38 (detailing information required under
Schedule A).
53. Q&A SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 9. Within 10 days of the
end of the offering or the final application of the offering proceeds, whichever is
later, the issuer must also file a Form SR report under Rule 463, or file interim re-
ports every six months until the offering ends. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES,
supra note 43, at 7.
54. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 3. Other forms exist, but
are used less. For example, Form S-4 is used for registration of securities obtained
by a company's shareholders in mergers, consolidations, and asset transfers. Id.; 17
C.F.R § 239.25 (1996).
Forms F-1 through F-4 correspond to Forms S-1 through S-4 and are used by
not registered under the 1934 Act for at least three years and does not
qualify to register under the other available forms; thus, this is the stan-
dard form for companies engaging in an initial public offering (IPO).
Issuers must disclose all required information in the prospectus in a
Form S-I registration statement; information cannot be "incorporated
by reference" to any of the issuer's prior 1934 Act filings.' This infor-
mation generally includes the basic information package (BIP) outlined
by Regulation S-K,5 the Standard Registration Items,' and certain
other areas of detailed disclosure.'
Form S-2 may be used if the issuing company has registered under
the 1934 Act for at least three years prior to the current issuance.'
The issuer is required to disclose the same information as in Form S-i,
but Form S-2 permits the issuer to satisfy the disclosure requirement by
incorporating several 1934 Act disclosures by reference, such as the
annual report to shareholders and the latest 10-Q report."
Form S-3 can be used by companies that (1) have at least $150 mil-
lion in stock held by non-affiliates, or $100 million so held and at least
three million shares of annual trading volume, and (2) otherwise qualify
foreign issuers. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.31-.34 (1996). FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, su1-
pra note 43, at 3. Forms N-1 through N4 are used by investment companies to regis-
ter securities and annuity contracts. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.14, 239.15, 239.17a, 239.17b,
274.11, .la-I, .llb-.llc (1996). FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at
4.
Form S-8 is used to register any securities issued as part of an employee benefit
plan. 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b (1996). FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43,
at 4.
Form S-18 may be used by small companies to sell a maximum of $7.5 million
of securities with a maximum of $1.5 million sold by "insiders." 17 C.F.R § 239.28
(1996). FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 4.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1996); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBUC AND THE PUB-
LIC CORPORATION § 4.01 (1992).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11; BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 6.03.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11; BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, §§ 6.03, 6.06. The BIP, de-
fined largely by disclosures required under Items 101, 201, and 301-304 of Regulation
S-K, consists of financial statements and financial information from the last five years,
business and market information by segment, Management Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operation (MD&A), and other required financial
and accounting information. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101, .201, .301-.304 (1996). See gene'raIly
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 6.06 (discussing the contents of the BIP).
58. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.501-.512, 239.11 (1996); BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, §§ 6.03-
.04, 9.04.
59. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101-103, 229.401-.403, 239.11 (1996); BLOOMENTHAL, supra note
55, §§ 6.03, 6.07. Professor Bloomenthal calls this "in-depth disclosure." See generaly
BLOOMElNmHAL, supra note 55, § 6.07.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1996); BLOOMENrrHAL, supra note 55, § 9.05.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 239.12; BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 6.02.
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to fe Form S-2.' Of all the S-registration forms, Form S-3 allows the
least amount of disclosure in the prospectus and, except for the Stan-
dard Registration Items, permits almost all of the required information
to be incorporated by reference to 1934 Act reports.63
c. Review of the registration statement and the effective date
Once the issuer's lawyers, executive and financial officers, and under-
writers complete the registration statement, it is submitted to the Com-
mission and deemed "filed" when received by the Commission with the
proper filing fee and signatures.' After the issuer files the registration
statement, the Commission's Division of Corporate Finance undertakes
a selective review process of certain registration statements.' During
this review, the Commission makes no determination as to the substan-
tive merit of an offering, but merely ensures that the issuer made all re-
quired disclosures.' Under the selective review system, 'companies is-
suing securities for the first time receive close scrutiny and a complete
review, whereas seasoned issuers often receive little or no review.67
The SEC will frequently send a "letter of comment" to the issuer that
requests changes, corrections, or a more complete disclosure in the
registration statement.' The issuer must then amend the registration
statement or provide further information to comply with requests in the
letter of comment.'
The registration statement must often undergo review by other regu-
latory bodies as well. The National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) reviews registration statements if the "underwriting or selling
group participants are NASD members."7" This review typically looks
at the "fairness and reasonableness of the underwriting arrangement
62. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1) (1996); BwOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 9.05.
63. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13; BLOOMENTrHAL, supra note 55, § 9.05. Under Rule 415, corn-
parties that qualify to file Form S-3 can use shelf registration for some securities. 17
C.F.R § 230.415(a)(1)(x) (1996); see i(fra notes 222-34 and accompanying text
(discussing shelf registration).
64. 17 C.F.RY § 230.456 (1996); BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 9.02.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-1 (1996); BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 9.02.
66. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 6.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 8.
and compensation," but does not review the merits of the offering itself
or the offering price.71
State regulatory agencies also review a new issue in the issuer's state
of incorporation as part of the "blue skying" process. 2 An issue must
comply with the blue sky laws of every state where the issue is to be
offered.'
Under section 5 of the Securities Act,' a security cannot be sold
publicly until its registration statement becomes "effective."71 Under
section 8(a) of the Securities Act,7' the registration statement normally
becomes effective twenty days after the date of filing of the last materi-
al amendment, but under Rule 473,77 modem registration statements
include a "delaying amendment" on the facing sheet which automatical-
ly delays the effective date until the SEC has reviewed the statement.7'
This prevents a defective statement from becoming effective without
SEC review.79
2. Restrictions on Solicitation
Section 5 of the Securities Act contains two important restrictions on
the solicitation of investors prior to the effective date: (1) the directives
against "gun-jumping" in section 5(c), and (2) the directives against
"free writing" in section 5(b)(1).' First, a company cannot sell or
71. Id. See generally BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 9.14 (discussing NASD re-
view).
72. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 371-72 (5th ed. 1994).
73. Id. States generally allow for one of the following three alternative forms of
registration: (1) registration by qualification (full registration for securities not re-
quired to be registered under the 1933 Act); (2) registration by coordination (state
registration of securities in the process of 1933 Act registration, accomplished by
filing copies of the prospectus and other requested information with the state); and
(3) registration by notification (registration on a simplified form for publicly traded
issuers who "have had an 'established business for five years" and whose securities fit
other financial requirements). Id. at 372.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
75. Q&A. SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 8.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1994).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 230.473 (1996).
78. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 7 n.13. Issuers normally submit a "pricing amend-
ment" on the day of the scheduled effective date that includes the offering price and
other disclosures regarding underwriting. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 9.02. Along
with the pricing amendment, the issuer also asks the Commission to "accelerate" the
effective date by issuing an order making the registration statement effective before
the customary 20-day waiting period. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.460-.461 (1996).
79. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 9.02.
80. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1150-51; see 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994) (gun-jumping
prohibition); id. § 77e(b)(1) (free writing prohibition).
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make oral or written offers to sell its securities before filing the regis-
tration statement with the Commission-the issuer may only make a
statement disclosing a proposal to make a registered public offering."'
This is commonly referred to as the gun-jumping prohibition-issuers
cannot "jump the gun" and offer their securities to potential investors
before the registration statement becomes effective.' Until recently,
the Commission construed section 5(c) to' forbid issuers from condi-
tioning the market in any way prior to the filing of the registration
statement.
Second, during the period after submission of the registration state-
ment to the SEC, but before SEC review and the effective date, the
issuer and underwriter may orally solicit potential investors and obtain
"indications of interest" from prospective buyers; the only written solic-
itation allowed, however, is through the preliminary or "red herring"
prospectus included in the pending registration statement.' This is
commonly called the free writing prohibition.'
81. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1150-52; see 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c); see also FEDERAL REG-
ULATION OF SECURITIES, supr note 43, at 7.
82. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1150.
83. Id. at 1151-52. The Commission's decision in In re Carl Loeb, Rhoades & Co.,
38 S.E.C. 843 (1959), extended the section 5(c) solicitation prohibition to pre-filing
evaluations of the offered securities or other securities and assets, viewing such esti-
mates as a form of "conditioning the market" Loeb, 38 S.E.C. at 848-51; see Chris-
Craft Indus. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 574-76 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v.
Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The Commission substantially re-
treated from this position in proposing Rule 135(d), which would allow issuers to test
the waters by soliciting indications of interest prior to filing the registration state-
ment. See infra notes 271-83 and accompanying text (discussing Proposed Rule
135(d)).
84. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1151-52; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(3), 77e(b)(1) (1994); see
also FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 7. "Tombstone ads,"
named for their tombstone-like appearance and style when printed, generally an-
nounce that the preliminary or red herring prospectuses are available for interested
investors, and are allowed during the pre-review period. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at
31. Most companies prefer to issue these advertisements after the effective date, how-
ever, once registration is complete. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note
43, at 7.
85. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1151. Normally, public corporations subject to the
disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act cannot use their regular 1934 Act disclosures
to publicize an upcoming securities offering. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, su-
pra note 43, at 7.
3. Exemptions From Registration
Over the years, the SEC has developed alternatives for issuers who
wish to avoid the high cost and extensive disclosure associated with
full registration under section 5 of the Act in the form of exemptions to
registration.'M In general, the exemptions allow sales of securities to
certain institutional investors and other sophisticated purchasers who
are more informed and thus less in need of the forced disclosure
protections of the 1933 Act." Exempted offerings are still subject to
the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Acte and will often be subject to
state blue sky laws and other regulations as well.'
Section 4(2), commonly referred to as the "private placement exemp-
tion," exempts issuers from having to file a registration statement and
issue a prospectus to potential investors of the class of securities in
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."M Initially,
a transaction was deemed to fall under the private placement exemp-
tion only if the number of offerees did not exceed twenty-five." The
Supreme Court has since ruled, however, that the propriety of the pri-
vate placement exemption should be based not simply on the number
of offerees, but on the sophistication of the target investors and their
ability "to fend for themselves. " ' Thus, for the private placement ex-
emption to apply, all offerees must have sufficient access to issuer
information and a level of sophistication indicating that they do not
need the protection afforded by the traditional disclosure protections of
section 5 of the 1933 Act.'
Section 4(6), the "accredited investor exemption," exempts offerings
or sales solely to accredited investors if the aggregate amount of the
86. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 9. The burden falls on the issuer to prove that it
qualifies for the desired exemption and is not subject to § 5 registration require-
ments. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
87. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 9-14. Some exemptions focus not on the buyer, but
on the seller, excluding, for example, certain types of banks and government securi-
ties from the registration requirements. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 4.01.
88. See iftru notes 116-21 and accompanying text (discussing section 11 liability).
89. Q&A. SMALL BusINEss AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 13; see supra notes 72-
73 and accompanying text (discussing blue skying an issue).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). Professor Bloomenthal calls this the "principal ex-
emption" used by investors. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 4.01. For an in-depth
discussion of the boundaries of the private placement exemption under section 4(2),
see JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 315-76.
91. Johnson, supra note 23, at 318-19.
92. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
93. Id. An offering is considered public under the Ralston Purina rationale when
"'the means used to select the particular individuals to whom the offering is to be
made bear no sensible relation to the purposes for which the selection is made.'" Id.
at 124 (quoting SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938)).
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offering is less than $5 million and the issuer employs no advertising or
public solicitation prior to, or during, the offering."
Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act exempts offerings of less than $5 million
if the SEC determines that registration is "not necessary in the public
interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering. Pur-
suant to this exemption, Regulation A exempts 3(b) offerings up to
$5 million in any one year if the issuer follows a simplified registration
process by submitting a short, unaudited financial statement to the
Commission, filing an offering statement (consisting of an offering cir-
cular and exhibits) with the Commission's regional office, and distrib-
uting the offering circular to prospective investors and offerees of the
securities.'
Section 3(a)(11), known as the "intrastate offering exemption," ex-
empts securities offered and sold only to residents of the state where
the issuer is incorporated and doing business.' To qualify for the
3(a)(11) exemption, an issuer must verify the residence of each pur-
chaser of the securities.'
Section 3(a)(2), the "municipal securities exemption," exempts securi-
ties issued by state and local governmental entities."4 These securities
are not subject to 1933 Act or 1934 Act registration or disclosure, but
are still subject to the anti-fraud provisions of both acts. 0'
Finally, Regulation D, Rules 504-506' (the "limited offering" exemp-
tions) exempt certain issuances of securities based on the amount of
the offering and the absence of general solicitation or advertising."
Rule 504 exempts all offers up to $1 million in any one year by compa-
nies not subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act, so long
as the offering is not accompanied by general solicitation or general
advertising. 4 Rule 505 exempts offers up to $5 million in any one
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6).
95. Id. § 77c(b) (1994).
96. 17 C.F.t § 230.251 (1995).
97. Q&A- SMALL BusINEss AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 15-16.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 14.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2).
101. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SwCuRmEs, supra note 43, at 12.
102. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1996).
103. Q&A: SMALL BusiNEss AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 16-20.
104. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504; Q&A SMALL BusNESS AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 17.
year if the number of "non-accredited investors"" is less than thirty-
five, those investors are given specialized information, and the offering
is not accompanied by general solicitation or general advertising.
Rule 506 exempts offers of unlimited amounts and without general
solicitation or advertising, if made to accredited investors and a maxi-
mum of thirty-five non-accredited investors reasonably believed by the
issuer to have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial matters
to evaluate the risks and merits of the investment and specialized infor-
mation given to them."°
The SEC may subject persons holding unregistered shares obtained
pursuant to an exemption to registration requirements if the holders
resell the securities." Restrictions apply only to the securities of the
issuer gained by the exemption; the holder may freely sell other public-
ly acquired securities of the issuer. °" Restricted securities generally
cannot be resold except under certain conditions. Rule 144A allows the
resale of certain restricted securities to qualified institutional buyers for
their own accounts."' Rules 144"' and 144A complement the private
placement exemptions in reducing or eliminating barriers to distribution
to secondary markets."2 Regulation D and Rule 144A have significant-
ly increased the use of private placements, partly because they allow
avoidance of traditional registration and review."3 As a result, domes-
tic Rule 144A placements between 1990 and 1993 skyrocketed from an
aggregate total of $916 million (eight placements) to a whopping
$44.672 billion (243 placements).14
105. Under Rule 501(a), accredited investors include, inter alia, traditional institu-
tional investors, directors and officers of the issuer, natural persons with minimum $1
million net worth, large trusts, and entities owned by accredited investors. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a); Q&k SMALL BusiNEss AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 17-18.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505; Q&A SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 17-
19.
107. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506; Q&. SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 19-
20.
108. CARL W. SCHNEIDER & JASON M. SHARGEL, Now THAT You ARE PUBLICLY OWNED
26 (1994).
109. Id.
110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1996); see Adoption of Proposed Rule 144A, Securities
Act Release No. 6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 84,523
(Apr. 23, 1990).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1996); see Adoption of Proposed Rule 144, Securities Act
Release No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 78,487 (Jan.
11, 1972).
112. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 14.
113. Id. at 14 n.3. The adoption of the short form S-3 registration statement and the
1982 universal shelf registration regulations has also shortened the waiting period dur-
ing which the Commission reviews an issue prior to registration, although the period
can still extend over a month or more. Id.
114. Id.; see Staff Report on Rule 144A, [1994-1995 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
[Vol 24: 563, 1997] The Case for Company Registration
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
4. Liability Under the 1933 Act
Private investors may seek three types of remedies based on an
issuer's violation of provisions of the 1933 Act.15 Section 11 of the
1933 Act"6 provides that an issuer will be strictly liable for losses in-
curred by a buyer purchasing a security within three years"7 of the
offering if the registration statement or prospectus contained material
misrepresentations or materially false or misleading statements or omis-
sions which caused the losses."8 The issuer's board of directors, un-
derwriters, executive officers, attorneys, accountants and other experts,
controlling persons of the issuer, and other signatories of the registra-
tion statement can also be held liable under section 11," 9 but only if
they did not perform a reasonable investigation into the accuracy of the
misstatements or otherwise did not have a reasonable belief that the
statements were true and not misleading (the due diligence de-
fense).2 ° Plaintiffs generally need not show reliance on the registra-
(CCH) 85,428 (Aug. 18, 1994).
115. BLomENToRH supra note 55, §§ 10.01-.02. In addition, a sale without registra-
tion can result in civil and criminal liability for the issuer and its controlling persons.
HA LTON, supra note 72, at 369.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
117. Id. § 77m (1994).
118. Id, § 77k(a). A showing that the plaintiffs losses cannot be traced to the mis-
representations but to another source (e.g. market fluctuations) constitutes an abso-
lute defense to liability both for the issuer and other defendants, but the defendant
bears the burden of proof to show the separate cause of the losses. Id. § 77k(e).
119. Id. § 77k(a).
120. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A). Under the due diligence defense, a reasonable investigation
and a good faith, reasonable belief that the statements were not misleading precludes
liability for most defendants other than the issuer. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A), (c). This inves-
tigation normally takes place prior to the filing of the registration statement and
typically includes checking the "background of prior transactions, determin[ing] wheth-
er disclosure may be required of transactions between the issuer and the managers,
[and] determin[ing] whether issues of securities were lawfully made pursuant to an
available exemption." HAmILTON, supra note 72, at 371. See generally BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 55, § 10.07 (describing the due diligence process prior to registration).
The defendant carries the burden of proving due diligence and reasonable belief
in the truth of the statements based on personal investigation, "not . . . made on the
authority of an expert." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A). If the statements were made on the
authority of an expert, the defendant must show he or she "had no reasonable
ground to believe and did not believe" that the statements were false or misleading.
Id. § 77k(b)(3)(C). If the defendant is an expert in the particular portion of the regis-
tation statement challenged, however, the burden is upon him or her to show rea-
sonable grounds to believe the portion was true and did not contain false or mislead-
tion statement.2 '
Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act"2 permits rescission of a purchase of
unregistered securities if the issuer should have registered the securities
and allows recovery of damages if the securities have been sold."23 A
buyer must bring a section 12(1) action within one year of the purchase
of the unregistered securities."5
Finally, section 12(2) of the 1933 Act"2 imposes strict liability on
any seller of securities for a buyer's losses resulting from material mis-
representations or misleading statements made in connection with the
sale, regardless of whether the securities are covered by the registration
statement." Under section 12(2), any person involved in the sale of
securities during which a material misrepresentation or omission is
made may be liable for damages if it is shown that they knew or should
have known of the misstatement. 127 Any private action must be
brought within one year after discovery of the material misstatement or
omission, or at most, three years after the public distribution of the
security misrepresented.
ing statements. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i),(ii). See generally Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing reasonable reliance on
experts by non-experts).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); see also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 575-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that an omission of $100,000 of "surplus
surplus" was a material omission from the registration statement). Certain purchasers
buying in the secondary markets must show reliance if the issuer has disclosed in-
come statements for the year following the effective date. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994).
123. Id.; see HAMILTON, supra note 72, at 369 n.28. This provision allows a purchas-
er to get a refund of consideration given for the unregistered securities regardless of
whether the failure to register was the issuer's fault. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2). See gen-
erally BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 10.02.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994).
125. Id. § 771(2).
126. HAMILTON, supra note 72, at 369 n.28. The liability is "strict" insofar as neither
intent nor negligence are conditions to the seller's liability. Id. The seller may raise
with validity, however, the defense of a lack of knowledge of the misstatement's
falsity or omission, coupled with proof that the seller could not have discovered,
through exercise of reasonable care, the falsity or omission. Id.
127. Id. Sellers of the securities may claim the same due diligence defense available
under section 11. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 10.02; supra note 120 and ac-
companying text (discussing the due diligence defense).
128. HAMILTON, supra note 72, at 369 n.28; see 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
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B. The Exchange Act of 1934is
The 1934 Act requires periodic disclosure from companies that are
"presumed to be the subject of active investor interest.""3 This in-
cludes companies issuing securities traded on an exchange and also
those with more than a specified number of shareholders and level of
assets. 3' In general, the 1934 Act performs four functions: (1) it pro-
vides a system of registration for publicly traded securities; (2) it regu-
lates certain types of securities transactions, usually by requiring addi-
tional disclosure upon their occurrence; (3) it establishes a system of
regular reporting for publicly traded companies; and (4) it prohibits
fraudulent practices and transactions in connection with the trading of
publicly held securities.32
1. Registration of Publicly Traded Securities
The 1934 Act contemplates "one-time registration of the entire class
of securities which is publicly-owned."" The 1934 Act requires sub-
mission of a registration statement if the security is (1) "[tjraded on a
national exchange, " "34 or (2) "[t]raded over-the-counter and the issuer
has more than $5 million in assets and over 500 shareholders of re-
cord,"'35 or (3) "[f]irst sold with an effective registration statement
under the 1933 Act."" In addition, certain persons and entities in-
volved in securities trading must also register.'37
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781J (1994).
130. Cohen, supra note 31, at 1341.
131. Id.
132. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supm note 43, at 13-14.
133. SCHNEIDER & SHARGEL, supra note 108, at 7.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1994).
135. Id. § 781(g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1996). A registration statement under
§ 781(g) is due 120 days after the end of the fiscal year in which the company be-
comes subject to registration and becomes effective 60 days after filing unless accel-
erated by the Commission upon the registrant's request. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1); see
SCHNEIDER & SHARGEL, supra note 108, at 8 & n. 14.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1994).
137. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-4 (1994) (brokers and dealers trading securities
covered by the 1934 Act or municipal securities); id, § 78o-4 (broker and dealer
associations); id. § 78k-1 (1994) (processors of securities information); id. § 78q-1
(1994) (clearing agencies and transfer agents); id, § 78f (1994) (national securities ex-
changes); see also FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURrrIES, supra note 43, at 13 (catego-
rizing who must register with the Commission).
Under the 1934 Act, disclosure requirements, which include "periodic
reports," continue until: (1) less than 300 owners of record at the begin-
ning of the fiscal year hold the class of securities offered, or (2) less
than 500 record owners hold the class of securities offered and the
issuer's total annual assets have been less than $5 million during the
past three fiscal years."
Registration under the 1934 Act occurs through the use of one of two
forms: Form 10 or Form 8-A. " Form 10 is used for the "initial regis-
tration of securities... when no other form is prescribed.""4 An issu-
er must fie eight copies of this form-three of which must be complete
with financial statements, exhibits, and supporting papers-with the
SEC.14 ' Form 8-A is a "simplified form for registering securities under
the 1934 Act."42 This form is available to any company that has regis-
tered before under either the 1933 or 1934 Act."
2. Regulated Transactions
The 1934 Act also regulates several kinds of transactions and entities
based on the SEC's perceived importance of disclosing certain transac-
tions to public investors and the importance of Commission regulation
of the transactions and entities." Regulated transactions include
proxy solicitations, 45 tender offers, 46 transactions involving credit
used in carrying or buying securities and credit margins in other
transactions, 147 trading activities which can affect market prices and
price stabilization, 41 mortgaging of or borrowing on securities,
49
short-swing profits and short sales made by corporate "insiders,""O
and certain activities of securities dealers. 5 ' Regulated entities include
138. Q&A. SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 11.
139. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 15.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994).
146. Id. § 78n(d). A tender offeror must file 10 copies of Schedule 14D-1 with the
SEC on the first day of the offer if it could result in the offeror owning more than
five percent of a class of 1934 Act-registered securities. Id.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1994).
148. Id. § 78i (1994).
149. Id. § 78h (1994).
150. Id. § 78p(b), (c) (1994). For a discussion of what constitutes an insider, see
infma note 154 and accompanying text.
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78k, 78o, 78o-4, 78q (1994).
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the national securities exchanges, the NASD, and various other agents
and processors of securities information. 58
3. Reporting Requirements
The 1934 Act requires the issuer," insiders of the issuer,'" certain
institutional investment managers, 5 and investors acquiring more
than a five percent interest in one of the issuer's 1934 Act-registered eq-
uity securities 5" to make periodic reports to the SEC disclosing cer-
tain aspects of their holdings and other financial information.'57 Insid-
ers must report their equity holdings, any changes in those holdings,
and any short-swing profits (profits resulting from a purchase and sale
within six months) that are required to be disgorged to the issuer by
statute. 68
Periodic disclosure required under section 13 of the 1934 Act"9
must reveal the latest information about business operations, including
any unusual trends or influences which would be reasonably necessary
to understand the company's business and financial data; salaries and
benefits accruing to management or shareholders; audited financial
statements; and any other major transactions between the company and
directors, officers, shareholders, creditors, or other parties."8 This dis-
closure is largely effected through three forms. The first is Form 10-K,
which is an annual report disclosing management and shareholder infor-
mation, audited financial statements, and other annual information that
must be filed with SEC.' The 10-K report includes Management's Dis-
cussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation
152. Id. §§ 78f, 78k, 78k-1, 78o-3, 78q.
153. Id. §§ 78m(a), 78o(d) (1994).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994). For purposes of 1934 Act reporting, insiders of an
issuer include officers, directors, and shareholders who beneficially own more than
1096 of the issuers outstanding shares. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, SUpra
note 43, at 14.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f).
156. Id. § 78m(d).
157. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 14.
158. Id.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
160. Q&A: SMALL BusINEss AND THE SEC, supra note 42, at 11.
161. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 15. This form is due 90
days after the end of the company's fiscal year and recounts all information disclosed
in the Form S-1 registration statement under the 1933 Act, except for "information on
the underwriting and use of proceeds." SCHNEIDER & SHARGEL, supr note 108, at 4.
(MD&A), which must disclose to shareholders any material trends,
uncertainties, or other events which are known to the company and are
reasonably believed to have a probable impact on the company's busi-
ness." The second is Form 10-Q, which is a quarterly report disclos-
ing financial information (unaudited) and other events of significance
occurring during the quarter, including the start of any significant litiga-
tion."6 The issuer must also include an MD&A, updating likely trends
or uncertainties reported in the annual 10-K if needed."8 The third is
Form 8-K, which is a current event report filed when a significant or
important business event occurs."6 These events include mergers and
acquisitions, receivership or bankruptcy, and other shifts in shareholder
control."6
4. Prohibition Against Fraudulent Practices
Section 10 of the 1934 Act prohibits fraud, deceptive practices, and
market manipulation in connection with the purchase and sale of secu-
rities.67 Violations of this section, which include violations of rules
promulgated by the Commission to enforce section 10, may give rise to
both civil and criminal liability."6 Generally, section 10(b) prohibits
the use of any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" con-
nected with the sale of securities "in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary. " "
Rule 10b-5 is the most prominent of these prescriptive rules, and
disallows trading by "tippers," "tippees," and other insiders based on
information not available to the general public without first disclosing
that information to the public. 7 ' Other significant rules include Rule
14a-9, '7 which bars false or misleading statements or omissions of
material facts in connection with proxy solicitations, and Rule 14e-3,'2
which forbids using inside information in trading the securities of an
offeror or target company while a tender offer is pending."
162. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 15.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id. This report is due 45 days after the end of each of the company's first
three fiscal quarters. Id.
165. Id. The Form 8-K is generally due within 15 days of the significant event Id.
166. Id.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
168. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURMES, supra note 43, at 22.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78j b).
170. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 22; see Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1996).
172. Id. § 240.14e-3.
173. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 22.
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5. Other Disclosures
Aside from the information required by the forms and the duty not to
affirmatively mislead, a company has no general duty to disclose al
material events to the general investing public." Nevertheless, under
some circumstances, a company may have a duty to issue a press re-
lease disclosing material information regarding the company, its securi-
ties, or a significant transaction.7" This duty normally applies only (1)
to companies whose securities are listed on NASDAQ or a public ex-
change, 78 (2) when incomplete disclosure has been made to the pub-
lic,'7 7 (3) when an insider or the company itself is acquiring the
company's securities," (4) when a public statement made by the
company is discovered to have been inaccurate at the time dis-
closed,'79 or (5) when the company is responsible for leaking a rumor,
market report, or other material information."s
174. SCHNEIDER & SHARGEL, supra note 108, at 22. Form 8-K requires disclosure of
certain significant events, but does not require companies to disclose all material
events. Id. Rule 101>5 forbids false or misleading statements of material fact and
omissions that make an existing statement misleading, but does not impose an affir-
mative duty to disclose material facts. Id.
175. Id. at 22-24.
176. These companies must disclose material events and information to all public
investors. Both the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange
require these companies to disclose material events and information to all public
investors. See New York Stock Exch., Listed Company Manual § 202.00 (1996);
American Stock Exch., American Stock Exch. Company Guide, Part 4, § 402 (1996);
American Stock Exch., Agreement to Conform with the Rules and Regulations, Listing
Form SD-i § 12 (1996). For NASDAQ disclosure requirements, see Schedules to the
By-Laws, Schedule D, pt. II § 1(c)(16), NASD MANUAL (CCH) 1803 (1995).
177. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974).
178. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968); Green v.
Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Purchases of
Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others; Adoption of Safe Harbor, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 6434, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. 83,276 (Nov.
17, 1982) (adopting Rule 10b-18 safe harbor for company acquisitions of own stock).
179. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993); see also
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83 F.R.D. 343, 347 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that an ac-
counting firm must rectify an opinion letter found to be materially inaccurate).
180. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 166-67; In re Sharon Steel Corp., Exchange Act Release
No. 18271, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 83,049 (Nov. 19,
1981); SCHNEIDER & SHARGE3L, supra note 108, at 23-24. Material information is defined
as information that "a reasonable investor would consider important" in deciding to
buy or sell a security. Id. at 21 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
m. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT DISCLOSURE SYSTEM
Since the inception of the 1933 Act, significant changes have oc-
curred throughout the capital markets and in the Commission's ap-
proach to securities regulation. These changes have led to a fundamen-
tal reassessment of the 1933 Act 8' and the idea of company registra-
tion. Information about companies and issues has become more wide-
spread and accessible to investors."M Sophisticated institutional inves-
tors now comprise the vast majority of all trading volume and equity
holdings across the market." Competition among underwriters for
issuers' business has intensified to new levels."M In short, the world
that gave birth to the 1933 and 1934 Acts has long since passed away,
leaving the unwieldy dual system of transactional and continuous dis-
closure dangerously close to complete obsolescence."
At the same time, development of the disclosure scheme over the
past sixty years has uncovered the best and worst of both Acts. Milton
H. Cohen's classic theory that "the combined disclosure requirements of
these statutes would have been quite different if the 1933 and 1934
Acts... had been enacted in the opposite order, or had been enacted
181. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 14.
182. See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Secu-
rities Regulation, 98 HARV. L REv. 747, 747-49 (1985) (suggesting that technological
developments giving investors access to a wide variety of information about issuers
may make adoption of an integrated system such as the Federal Securities Code
preferable).
183. See Seligman, supra note 5, at 657-58. Institutional investors own more than
half of all equity securities in the United States, and account for 60 to 80 percent of
the New York Stock Exchange's trading volume.. Id. For a discussion of the rise of
institutional investors and their equity holdings as a percentage of total market equity,
see infta notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
184. See ADVISORY COMMrITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 53 & n.60; see also
Welcome to the Free-For-All; Private Placement Bankers Adjust to a Radically Chang-
ing Marketplace, INV. DEALERS' DIG., Aug. 28, 1995, at 14 (noting "[flerocious competi-
tion" among investment and commerical banks for modem private placement busi-
nesses).
185. Indeed, some observers contend that "[s]tatutory obsolescence is the fate of all
legislation." Coffee, supra note 7, at 1144; see also GUmO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (advocating judicial revisionism in re-interpreting
outdated statutes by modem standards instead of interpreting original legislative in-
tent); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERiCAN LAW 97 (1977) (discussing the shift
over a statute's "life cycle" from court's deference to legislative intent to deference to
modem administrative implementation and interpretation); Donald C. Langevoort, Stat-
utory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of Courts in Fed-
eral Banking Legislation, 85 MIcH. L REV. 672 (1987) (arguing for judicial revision-
ism in reinterpreting older federal finance and banking laws to more current stan-
dards).
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as a single, integrated statute,""M has been borne out: the disclosure
system is ever weakening the 1933 Act, and the market has thus come
to rely on 1934 Act disclosures in order to strike a balance between the
full and fair disclosure today's investors want and the capital today's
companies need."' As issuers make more offerings by means of off-
shore placements and registration exemptions, the question quickly be-
comes whether the burdens of section 5 on capital formation are worth
its disclosure benefits to investors, or whether it is time for a new sys-
tem of disclosure.
A. The Shift to Integrated Disclosure
1. Cohen and "The Need for a New Look" at Securities
Disclosure"
In the years following the adoption of the 1934 Act, two parallel sys-
tems of securities disclosure developed: one based primarily on the
registration of certain securities transactions (public offerings) under
the 1933 Act, the other based on the periodic disclosure by most public-
ly held companies under the 1934 Act.8 9 The result was often
duplicative disclosure; though provided at different times and under
different circumstances, disclosure under both Acts flowed from a
"common core of information. 19
Recognizing this phenomenon, in 1966 Milton H. Cohen wrote the
landmark article, 'Truth in Securities" Revisited, which suggested that
the securities regulation system could be simplified by emphasizing the
periodic disclosure of the 1934 Act to protect and inform investors,
while relaxing or eliminating overlapping 1933 Act disclosure require-
ments.9 ' Cohen noted that a seasoned public corporation making peri-
186. Cohen, supra note 31, at 1341.
187. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1145, 1148-50. Professor Coffee argues that Cohen's
analysis is vindicated by such market developments as the rise of institutional inves-
tors, the growth of the secondary markets, and the acceptance of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis-all of which contributed to Commission interpretations that have
eroded the "pillars" of the 1933 Act. Id. at 1149-50. This "erosion" has been replaced
with an increased emphasis on 1934 Act disclosure. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 15.
188. Cohen entitled the first point heading of his article: The Need for a New Look.
Cohen, supra note 31, at 1340.
189. Id. at 1340-41.
190. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 32, at 60-61.
191. Cohen, supra note 31, at 1341-42. Cohen's article illustrates the confusing re-
sults produced by overlapping disclosure requirements through four hypotheticals,
odic public offerings of its stock must disclose an extensive amount of
information in its prospectus, much of which the corporation may al-
ready have disclosed in its periodic 1934 Act filings." According to
Cohen, because the goal of full disclosure would be achieved more
efficiently in a system which provides continuous and up-to-date disclo-
sure to investors, rather than one that emphasizes one-time disclosure
only when the issuer makes a public offering, the securities laws should
emphasize 1934 Act disclosure while scaling back or eliminating the
repetitive disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act.9 Thus, a reporting
issuer under the 1934 Act could make a public securities offering and
only disclose supplemental information about the issuer and offering
not already disclosed in 1934 Act reports."4
Cohen's article is widely hailed as the genesis for the integrated dis-
closure movement'95 and was the driving force behind the Wheat Re-
port," a pivotal Commission study which formulated specific propos-
als for integration of disclosure within the two Acts. 97
each assuming company ZYX lists its stock on an exchange and is subject to the
reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. First, if an investor buys 100 ZYX shares on
a stock exchange, the investor will receive no prospectus but can rely on information
provided in ZYX's periodic reports under the 1934 Act. Id. at 1342. This investor thus
relies primarily on the protections and required disclosures of the 1934 Act. Id. Sec-
ond, if the same investor goes to the exchange and buys 100 shares of ZYX which
are part of a registered issuance by ZYX, the investor should receive a prospectus
containing disclosures about ZYX, its business and finances, and the issuance itself.
Id. This investor receives disclosure mandated by the 1933 Act, but much of the
information is also available from the issuer's 1934 Act reports. Id. Third, if the in-
vestor goes to the exchange at the same time that the registered issuance is being
offered, but buys 100 ZYX shares which are not part of the registered issuance, he
now has no right to a prospectus. Id. Thus, while some of ZYX's shares come with
mandatory 1933 Act disclosure, an identical block of shares the investor bought does
not come with the disclosure, again forcing the investor to rely solely on 1934 Act
disclosure. Id. Fourth, if the investor buys 100 ZYX shares from someone other than
the issuer or its affiliate, the seller does not need to register the shares. Id. The
investor has no right to a prospectus and may not even receive information concern-
ing the present issuance. Id. Again, the investor receives no 1933 Act disclosure and
must turn to the issuer's 1934 Act reports for disclosure. Id.
192. Id. at 1345.
193. Id. at 1366-67.
194. Id. at 1341-42; see Coffee, supra note 7, at 1145.
195. Professor Coffee calls Cohen's article "the most influential article ever written
on the federal securities laws." Coffee, supra note 7, at 1145.
196. SECURTrrIES AND EXCH. COMM'N, DISCLOSURE TO INvEs'T-rs-A REAPPRAISAL OF
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (1969) [hereinafter
WHEAT REPorr].
197. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 32, at 61.
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2. Development of the Integrated Disclosure System and
Regulation S-K
By 1969, the idea of integrated disclosure envisioned by Milton Cohen
had garnered the support of the American Law Institute (AI)." The
ALI commissioned a group of leading scholars in the field of securities
regulation, led by renowned Harvard University Professor Louis Loss, to
construct a model securities code which would unify the disparate
federal securities laws into a fully integrated disclosure system."9 De-
spite completion of the Code in 1980 and Commission approval, Con-
gress was reluctant to dismantle the venerable 1933 and 1934 Acts with
an untried system, and quietly forgot the Code in the absence of a
strong lobby outside the Commission itself.'
Nevertheless, the Commission partially fulfilled the promise of
Cohen's model of full disclosure with their adoption of the integrated
disclosure system and Regulation S-K in 1982.1 In attempting to re-
duce duplicative disclosure through a system of integrated disclosure,
the Commission sought to define (1) what information is material in
securities transactions, and (2) when and how such information should
be disclosed to investors and the market'2° The Commission deter-
mined that information material under one of the Acts would generally
be material under the other Act, and that the amount and nature of dis-
closure necessary depended on how well informed investors already
were about the security involved.' The result was the adoption of
198. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1145.
199. Id.; see Louis Loss, 77Te American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Pro-
ject, 25 Bus. LAW. 27 (1969).
200. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1145-46.
201. 17 C.F.R. 229.10-.915 (1996) (Regulation S-K). For a discussion of the develop-
ment of the integrated disclosure system during the early 1980s, see Proposed Com-
prehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 6235, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 82,649, at 83,484-
90 (Sept. 2, 1980). See also Edward F. Greene, Integration of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act, A Case Study of Regulation in the Division of Corporate Finance
of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 3 J. COMP. CoRP. L &
SEC. REG. 75, 79-90 (1981).
202. Gerald S. Backman & Stephen E. Kim, A Cure For Securities Act Metaphysics:
Integrated Registration, INSIGHTS May 1995, at 18, 19; see Adoption of Integrated
Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982) [hereinafter Integrated Disclosure System
Releasel.
203. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19. The Commission was influenced at
least in part by the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH). For example, in de-
Regulation S-K, which provides a single standard for information to be
provided under 1933 and 1934 Acts disclosure documents.2
Under the integrated disclosure system, the informational require-
ments of disclosure in registration statements under the 1933 Act and in
filings under the 1934 Act are centralized in Regulation S-IK Regula-
tion S-K sets uniform disclosure requirements, or a Basic Information
Package, for Forms S-1 through S-4, S-8, S-11, and S-18 under the 1933
Act, and Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and the annual report to shareholders under
the 1934 Act 2" The BIP includes information about the issuer's fi-
nances and accounting (including the MD&A),2° a description of each
segment of the issuer's business2" and the market in which it oper-
ates,2" and other disclosures specific to the issue, such as dividend
information."
The Commission also adopted new registration forms S-I through S-3,
thereby creating a three-tier system of disclosure under the Regulation
S-K regime."' The system incrementally permits more incorporation
by reference: Form S-1 provides for no incorporation by reference;212
Form S-2 incorporates by reference all Form 10-K information into the
prospectus and allows the issuer to either provide investors with a pro-
spectus and annual report or incorporate the annual report information
into the prospectus when detailing the offering;' and Form S-3,
which only requires disclosure of information particular to the transac-
termining what information should be required to be disclosed in a prospectus, the
Commission recognized that some information may already be disclosed to the mar-
ket and reflected in the security's offering price, thus reducing or eliminating the
need to restate that information in an offering prospectus. Id. 'Thus, in what may be
termed the efficient market corollary, an adequately informed market does not require
redundant information to price a security." .Id.
204. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 6.03. The
Commission's goal was to promote the same quality of disclosure in 1934 Act reports
enjoyed by investors in the 1933 Act prospectus, while permitting seasoned reporting
issuers to incorporate by reference their 1934 Act reports into the prospectus during
a public offering. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1158.
205. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19; see also Peter G. Samuels, Statutory
Framework of the 1933 and 1934 Act Filing Requirements, in SECURTIES FIUNGS
1981, at 24 (1981).
206. See Integrated Disclosure System Release, supra note 202.
207. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.301, .303, .304.
208. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101(b), .101(c)(1)(i), .101(d).
209. Id. § 229.201.
210. Id. For an exhaustive treatment of the content of the BIP under Regulation S-
K, see BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 55, § 6.06.
211. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19; see supra notes 54-63 and accompany-
ing text (describing Forms S-I to S-3).
212. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (describing Form S-1).
213. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (describing Form S-2).
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tion, incorporates by reference almost all other issuer information
through 1934 Act reports as long as the issuer has duly filed its 1934
Act documents for at least one year prior to the disclosure.
21 4
Form S-8 and its accompanying Rule 424 provide for registration of
employee benefit plans and is a prime example of modem integrated
disclosure." Rather than issuing a formal prospectus, registrants us-
ing Form S-8 must give plan participants a "plan description" containing
the same information disclosed in Form S-8; however, the registrant
does not have to fie the plan description with the Commission.2 6 Sec-
tion 11 liability under the 1933 Act does not apply to these plan de-
scriptions.2 7 The issuer must also tell participants that all of its 1934
Act filings are incorporated by reference into the prospectus and are
available for inspection.1 ' The Form S-8 registration statement does
not need to restate plan description or prospectus information, but
simply must itemize all documents incorporated by reference and de-
scribe the securities issued, indemnification issues, "interests of named
experts and counsel," undertakings, and exhibits.2 9 Although Form S-8
and Rule 415 shelf registration22 represent the Commission's closest
steps toward establishing a fully integrated system, the ultimate goal of
a unified disclosure system remains elusive.22
214. Baclman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19; see supra notes 62-63 and accompany-
ing text (describing Form S-3); see also Integrated Disclosure System Release, supra
note 202. If an initial offering for cash is involved under Form S-3, the issuer must
have a minimum $75 million public float. General Instruction I.(B)(1) to Form S-3
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1) (1996)).
215. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19-20; see Registration and Reporting Re-
quirements for Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6867, [1990 Trans-
fer Binder) Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 84,605 (June 6, 1990) [hereinafter Registration
and Reporting Requirements for Employee Benefit Plans Release]. The required infor-
mation to be reported in Form S-8 is located in Part I, Item 1 of the Form. 17
C.F.R. § 239.16b (1996).
216. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19; see Registration and Reporting Require-
ments for Employee Benefit Plans Release, supra note 215.
217. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19.
218. Id.; see Part I, Item 2 of Form S-8, 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b. Under Rule
428(b)(1)(ii), issuers*can state in the plan description that the prospectus provides
certain required information. 17 C.F.R. § 230.428(b)(1)(ii) (1996).
219. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19-20. The issuer may also incorporate ex-
hibits by reference. Id.
220. 17 C.F.R § 230.415 (1996); see infra notes 212-34 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing shelf registration).
221. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1146.
B. The Advent of She(f Registration
The American system of securities regulation took another step to-
ward a true company registration model of disclosure with the adoption
of Form S-3 universal shelf registration under Rule 415.' For years
prior to adoption of Regulation S-K, the Commission opposed shelf
registration on the grounds that a single prospectus could not adequate-
ly provide investors with current information concerning continuing
issuances.'s When the Commission adopted the integrated disclosure
system, however, incorporation by reference to 1934 Act reports al-
lowed the prospectus to remain "current" by directing investors to the
issuer's latest 1934 Act filings.224 Thus, in 1983 the Commission
amended Rule 415 to allow shelf registration on Form S-3 for certain
issuers.'
Under Rule 415 shelf registration, an issuer can register any number
of securities "to be offered and sold on a continuous basis" at current
market value, up to a dollar amount equal to ten percent of its voting
stock's aggregate dollar value, so long as it reasonably expects to sell
the securities in the next two years. 6 Issuers may register all such
securities in an abbreviated version of the Form S-3 registration state-
ment, so long as the issuer (1) had continuously reported under the
1934 Act for at least one year, and (2) had at least a $75 million public
float (owned by non-affiliates) if engaging in a primary offering for
cash.17 The Form S-3 must contain certain information regarding the
222. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415.
223. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1158 & n.41. The Commission also opposed shelf reg-
istration as violative of § 6(a) of the 1933 Act, which states "'[a] registration state-
ment shall be deemed effective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed
to be offered.'" Id. at 1158 n.41 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1994)). The Commission
maintained that shelf registration would be inherently misleading because it attempted
to register more securities than the issuer presently intended to offer. See In re
Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. 109, 113 (1941).
224. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1158.
225. Id. at 1158-59; see Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 6499, [1983-
1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 83,499, at 86,335 (Nov. 17, 1983).
226. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.415(a)(1)(x)(a)(4)(ii), (a)(2). The Commission formerly required
shelf issuers to specify the precise number of securities offered pursuant to the shelf
registration statement, but in 1992 the Commission, in order to avoid market "over-
hang," began allowing "universal" registration of a total dollar amount of securities in
one or more classes. See Simplification of Registration Procedures for Primary Offer-
ings, Securities Act Release No. 6943, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
85,015 (July 16, 1992); see also infra note 233 and accompanying text (describing
the phenomenon of overhang in shelf registration).
227. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(x); see Form S-3, General Instructions I(A)(3)(a),
[(B)(1) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.13(a)(3)(i), (b)(1) (1996)); see also Seligman, su-
pra note 5, at 687-88 & n.165. The 1992 amendments to Form S-3 permit registration
of an unlimited number of securities within the stated dollar amount. Backman &
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issuances and any material changes in the issuer's business.2  The
rest of the information concerning the issuer is incorporated by refer-
ence to past and future 1934 Act reports.' Thus, when an issuer
wants to market, or "takedown," a new offering from "off the shelf," it
needs only to file an abbreviated prospectus supplement detailing the
offering and the securities.' °
Shelf registration has produced both advantages and disadvantages to
traditional 1933 Act registration. Issuers conducting shelf registrations
have found it less costly to go to market with an issue, both in terms of
the costs of the issuances and of disclosure."2 ' In contrast, the liability
imposed upon issuers by section 11 of the 1933 Act and the accompany-
ing duty imposed upon underwriters to exercise due diligence have not
worked well within the shelf registration system because shelf registra-
tion transactions occur too quickly for underwriters to exercise proper
due diligence.' Moreover, some issuers notice that shelf-registered
Kim, supra note 202, at 19; see Simplification of Registration Procedures For Primary
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6964, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L Rep. (CCH) 85,053 (Oct. 22, 1992).
228. Information must be provided under Items 202, 501-12, 601, and 702 of Regula-
tion S-K 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.202, .501-.512, .601, .702 (1996); see also Seligman, supra
note 5, at 687 & n.166.
229. 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a), (b), (e) (permitting incorporation by reference in Form
S-3 to issuer's 1934 Act filings and reports); see also Seligman, supra note 5, at 687-
88.
230. 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a), (b), (e); see also Seligman, supra note 5, at 687-88. The
Commission does not review the prospectus supplement and the issuer may use the
prospectus immediately to market the new offering. See ADVISORY COMmiTTEE REPoRT,
supra note 1, app. A at 17-18.
231. Seligman, supra note 5, at 688. The Commission estimated that issuers using
the shelf registration system as early as 1983 saved nearly $280 million in complying
with federal disclosure requirements. Id. at 688-89 n.171 (citing Memorandum to
George Kundahl, [SEC] Executive Director, from David Malmquist, Re: Estimates of
Savings to Issuers Resulting from Rule 415 (May 17, 1984), reprinted in SEC Over-
sight and Technical Amendments: Hearing Before, the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Con-
sumer Protection, and Fin, of House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.,
322-24 (1984)).
232. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1148. Because 1934 Act filings are incorporated into
the Form S-3 prospectus by reference, issuers and underwriters in a shelf registration
arguably face section 11 strict liability in connection with their 1934 Act reports. Id.
at 1160 & n.46; see 17 C.F.R § 230.176 (1996). This situation is not ameliorated by
the purported safe harbor of Rule 176, which has not yet been interpreted by the
courts. Coffee, supra note 7 at 1160 & n.46; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.176. While the Com-
mission has never explicitly stated that all 1934 Act documents incorporated by ref-
erence are subject to section 11 liability, liability is suggested in Rule 439. Coffee,
securities often suffer a "penalty" or "overhang" from the market, caus-
ing investors to stay away from the issue for fear of future dilution by
additional unannounced issuances."ss Notwithstanding shelf reg-
istration's promise of an efficient, rapid means of raising capital, these
costs have made shelf registration relatively unpopular among
issuers.'
C. 1933 Act in Transition: Inconsistency and Pressure For Change
Observers argue that the 1933 Act's transactional emphasis is funda-
mentally incompatible with, and duplicative of, continuous disclosure
under the 1934 Act and serves as a costly obstacle to modem capital
supra note 7, at 1165-66; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.439 (1996). But see William J. Williams,
Jr., Problems in the Application of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rules Thereunder
to She~f Offerings, 14 ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 293, 297 (1982) (arguing that 1934 Act
documents, except for the 10-K, are incorporated by reference only into the prospec-
tus, not the registration statement, meaning that such filings are subject only to sec-
tion 12(2) liability and not section 11).
233. See David J. Denis, Shef Registration and the Market for Seasoned Equity Of-
ferings, 64 J. Bus. 189, 197-98 (1991). Other observers notice similar price depres-
sions even upon announcement of proposed offerings through traditional 1933 Act
registration. See generally Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Equity Issuers and Of-
ferings Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 61 (1986); Michael J. Barclay & Robert H.
Litzenberger, Announcement Effects of New Equity Issues and the Use of Intraday
Price Data, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1988). The Advisory Committee suggests that over-
hang may represent the market's view that the issuer is selling more common stock
because the stock price has reached an upper limit. See ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT,
supra note 1, app. A at 21 & tbl. 3. Traders who sell the stock short on news of an
impending shelf offering then cover when the offering is made tend to reinforce the
market's view and accompanying price decline. Id. app. A at 22 & n.11-13; see Karen
Bernstein, Some New Buyers Emerge Prom Gloom, BIOCENTURY, THE BERNSTEIN RE-
PORT ON BiOBusINESs, May 6, 1995, at A3. Market overhang seems more pronounced
for smaller issuers, whose investors may have greater reason to fear the dilutive
impact of new offerings. ADVLSORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A. at 20-21.
Moreover, the Commission's amendment of shelf registration in 1992 to allow registra-
tion of an unallocated amount of securities has not dissipated market concerns about
overhang, as underwriters continue to advise issuers not to use the universal shelf
procedure due to overhang. Id. app A. at 23-24 & n.15. Yet, as more companies par-
ticipate in the universal shelf registration system, the overhang from an issuer's filing
of a shelf registration may disappear. See Steven M.H. Wallman, The SEC and the
Capital Formation Process, INSIGHTS, May 1995, at 2, 3.
234. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1170-71; see Denis, supra note 233, at 190 (noting a
drop in shelf offerings since the adoption of Rule 415). But see ADVISORY COMMrrrEE
REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 19 & tbl. 4 (noting that while shelf offerings for
corporate debt have declined from 4896 of all underwritten debt offerings in 1992 to
3396 in 1995, shelf offerings of common stock rose from 396 of all underwritten repeat
stock offerings in 1992 to 15% in 1995, and shelf offerings of preferred stock also
rose from 3896 of total underwritten repeat offers in 1992 to 65% in 1995).
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raising.' In order to preserve artificial distinctions between the re-
quirements of transactional and periodic reporting, the Commission
makes unusual interpretations of terms such as "integration" and "gun-
jumping," while investors and issuers make an end run around the 1933
Act's disclosure system through the Act's registration exemptions.2 '
According to Commissioner Steven M.H. Wallman, chairman of the
Advisory Committee, the experience of the past decade has raised fun-
damental "question[s] ... as to whether the current registration require-
ments erect unnecessary obstacles to capital formation without produc-
ing countervailing informational benefits for investors."237
1. The Rise of Institutional Investors and Changes in the Capital
Markets
The development of increasingly competitive capital markets, along
with higher levels of investor sophistication and increasing costs of
registration, have resulted in enormous pressures on the Securities Act
of 1933 to give way to modem realities.' Unlike the 1930s, institu-
tional investors dominate American equity markets and hold the majori-
ty of equity in domestic corporations.2 By 1990, pension and mutual
funds owned 35.4% of the total equity holdings in the market and 1993
data suggested that both figures were rapidly on the rise.24 As institu-
235. Wallman, supra note 233, at 2.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 3.
238. John C. Coffee, Jr., An 'Evergreen' Company Registration Approach Would
Modernize the 1933 Act, but it Raises Questions About the Limits on the SECs
Authority, NAT'L 1J., Sept. 11, 1995, at B4. Jonathan Macey goes so far as to say
that these changes have not only proven the outdated nature of the 1933 Act, but
have also rendered the Commission a largely unnecessary historical anachronism. See
Jonathan Macey, The SEC Dinosaur Expands Its Thr, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1992, at
A12; Jonathan R Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L REV. 909 (1994); see
also supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing statutory obsolescence).
239. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1148-49. Institutional investors, which include pension
funds, mutual funds, life and casualty insurers, bank trusts, foundations, and endow-
ments, accounted for about 53.396 of all equity holdings in the United States in 1990,
as compared to 3896 in 1981 and 2396 in 1955. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and
the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDozo L REV. 837, 848 (1994).
240. Coffee, supra note 239, at 848. Pension funds accounted for 28.296 of the
market's total equity holdings in 1990, while mutual funds owned 7.2% of the
market's equity issues. Professor Mark J. Roe estimated that, based on Federal Re-
serve System data, these figures rose to 31.3% and 10.396, respectively, by the first
tional investors have expanded their ownership of, and influence over,
public corporations, the investors have increasingly engaged in a moni-
toring role, gathering extensive data about these corporations both to
evaluate the quality of the investment and to exert some measure of
control over management decisions."II These sophisticated investors
are a far cry from the relatively unsophisticated individual investor
targeted for protection by the 1933 Act.
As the character of the average investor has changed, so too has the
character of the equity markets in which the investor now participates.
The demand for capital has risen dramatically in the trading markets as
compared with the primary offering markets: by 1995, the secondary
trading markets enjoyed over thirty-five times the volume of the prima-
ry issuance markets. 2 Moreover, while the secondary trading markets
have undergone tremendous growth in the past twenty years, volume in
the primary issuance markets remains near its 1975 level.'u Because
secondary trading transactions usually fall outside the coverage of the
1933 Act, market investors have come to rely primarily upon the
protections and disclosures of the 1934 Act as opposed to those of the
1933 Act.14
This growth in the secondary markets has also increased market
volatility."4 For example, average annualized standard deviations in
monthly returns on stocks in the Standard & Poor's 500 index reached
16.6% in the 1975-1993 period, up from 13.3% between 1950 and
1975."6 This volatility led to smaller windows of opportunity for issu-
quarter of 1993. Id. at 848 n.38; see MARK J. ROE, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PENSIONS I n.1 (Columbia Center for Law and Economic Studies Working
Paper No. 101, 1993).
241. Coffee, supra note 239, at 837-38 & n.3.
242. ADVISORY COMMrIrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 57 & fig. 2. In 1995, reg-
istrations of equity in the primary issuance markets accounted for $155 billion of vol-
ume. Id. The combined exchange and NASDAQ volume for the same period exceeded
$5.5 trillion. Id.
243. Since 1975, combined exchange and NASDAQ volume has increased over
1100%, while primary equity offering volume has remained virtually flat Id. The little
growth the primary equity markets have experienced can be traced more to an in-
crease in corporate bond issues than to equity sales, which have suffered steep de-
clines in the past 10 years. Id. app. A at 58 n.66 & fig. 1.
244. Id. app. A at 58. Even in primary issuances governed by the 1933 Act, the rise
of S-3 shelf registration and incorporation by reference has led investors to even
greater reliance on 1934 Act disclosures. Id. app. A at 59.
245. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1147.
246. Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L REV.
713, 730 (1995). Mahoney's article notes the academic debate as to whether this in-
crease in volatility is a pattern over time or simply a localized result of the 1987
stock market crash. Id. at 730-31. Nonetheless, the answer may be irrelevant for
purposes of issuer expectations; more importantly, issuers believe there is such vola-
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ers to capitalize on market demand, and in turn, a strong incentive for
issuers to use shelf registration as a way to act quickly to capture that
demand. 1
7
While primary issue market volume has remained sluggish, the costs
of making traditional 1933 Act disclosure in that primary equity market
have steadily increased. For many larger corporations, the costs of reg-
istering new securities and issuing a prospectus for every equity offer-
ing are extremely burdensome, and for smaller companies, they can be
prohibitive.' These transaction costs make capital formation ineffi-
cient and weigh down the growth of otherwise promising compa-
ies.'
From 1990 to 1994, issuers raising capital through IPOs incurred
costs averaging 11% of the total proceeds raised.2" Thus, in a typical
IPO of $30 million, an issuer would incur approximately $3.3 million in
expenses. Similar costs in periodic equity offerings (non-IPOs) of sea-
soned issuers averaged about 7.1% of total proceeds raised, or about
$2.1 million in costs for a $30 million offering."5 Figures from 1993 to
1995 show increases in both cost categories for domestic issu-
ers-16.9% of total proceeds for IPOs and 7.3% for repeat equity offer-
ings.' Thus, issuers face substantial expenses when going to market
with an equity offering, attributable in part to the regulatory burdens
involved in these offerings.2"
Moreover, from 1993 to 1995, issuers making repeat offers through
shelf registration incurred significantly lower costs than their counter-
tility in the markets, and plan accordingly. Id.; see Sean Becketti & Gordon H. Sellon,
Jr., Has Financial Market Volatility Increased?, ECON. REV., June 1989, at 17, re-
printed in REsEARcH Div., FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, FINANCIAL MARKET
VOLATIuTY AND THE ECONOMY 3 (1990) ("There is a widespread perception that finan-
cial market volatility has increased during the 1980s." (emphasis added)).
247. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1147.
248. See infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
249. See ADVISORY COMmITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3 & app. A at 2-44.
250. ADVISORY COMMTTEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 2-3 (citing inmoo Lee et
aL, The Costs of Raising Capital, J. FIN. RES., Spring 1996, at 59-74). These costs
typically include not only underwriting fees, but also costs such as legal and account-
ing fees, printing costs, federal and state filing fees, and discounts from market price
designed to attract investors to the offering during the review period. ADVISORY COM-
MPrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 2-3 & tbl. 1.
251. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 2-3 (citing lnmoo Lee et
al, supra note 250, at 59-74).
252. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 3 & tbl. 1.
253. Id. app. A at 5-6.
parts making the same offers through Form S-1.2" S-1 issuers spent
9.2% of their offering proceeds on costs related to the offering, while
shelf registrants using Form S-3 spent only 5% of total proceeds on
expenses." These cost savings come primarily from the S-3 issuer's
ability to market and sell its shelf offerings at current market price,
whereas the S-1 issuer typically discounts its securities an average of
2.4% from market price because of delays between registration and
public sale.' Thus, in recent years, Form S-3 shelf registration has
successfully reduced part of the burdensome costs associated with
raising capital in traditional Form S-1 offerings, while giving issuers
more flexibility in deciding when to go to market and how much to
raise.
2. Commission Inconsistency and "Metaphysics"
Some commentators have suggested that in recent years, the Com-
mission has created incongruous results by construing key 1933 Act
terms and concepts in a "metaphysical" or "hypertechnical" way in
order to preserve the idea of transactional disclosure in the 1933
Act."6 7 This hypertechnicality, observers argue, partially results from
the merging of the private and public markets, represented by transac-
tions such as private investment-public entities (PIPEs) and AB ex-
change offers which start as private placements and end as public offer-
ings.2" The Commission's effort to make strict distinctions between
"public" and "private" transactions is incompatible with this merging of
the two markets, and has led to issuer uncertainty as to which offerings
the Commission will deem permissible.2"
254. Id.
255. Id. app. A at 6 & tbl. 1. Table 2 in Appendix A of the Report shows that
these differences are not due solely to the larger amount raised in a typical shelf
offering compared to an S-1 repeat offering-they also exist for offers of varying
sizes between $20 million and $199.9 million. Id. app. A at 6 & tbl. 2.
256. Id. app. A at 7 & tbl. 1. The cost savings may also be attributed to "just-in-
time" financing, a method of capital raising facilitated by shelf registration whereby
issuers "can access the market exactly when they want and for the exact amount
they want," thereby lowering transaction costs associated with the offering. Id. app. A
at 7.
257. See Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 18-19; Stanley Keller, Basic Securities
Act Concepts Revisited, INSIGHTS, May 1995, at 5; see also ADVISORY COMmIrrrEE RE-
Por, supra note 1, at 10, 51, app. A at 30.
258. See Keller, supra note 257, at 6-7; infra notes 324-33 and accompanying text
(discussing PIPE transactions and AB exchange offers).
259. Keller, supra note 257, at 11.
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a. Roll-up transactions and integration inconsistencies
The Commission first applied basic concepts in a hypertechnical way
in roll-up transactions-reorganizations of "limited-life entities" such as
limited partnerships.2' An umbrella partnership real estate investment
trust (UPREIT) is a type of roll-up in which a limited partnership trans-
fers its assets to an umbrella partnership (UP) under the control of a
real estate investment trust (REIT). 21' The UPRE1T involves two steps:
(1) the transfer of partnership assets to the REIT (ostensibly a private
offering), and (2) the public offering of REIT shares, the proceeds of
which comprise the REIT's capital contribution to the UP.2" In 1993,
in response to reports of abuses, Congress cracked down on roll-ups
and required the Commission to tightly regulate all roll-ups involving a
public offering.2" Although the transfer of partnership assets in
UPREITs had previously been considered a private offering, the Com-
mission reversed itself and ruled that the asset transfer was "integrated"
with the later public offering through the REIT, so that the new statute
regulated both steps of the UPREIT 4.2  Later, the Commission extend-
ed this reasoning to all organizations created solely to engage in a pub-
lic offering and concluded that "a private offer of securities cannot be
combined with a registered sale."2" The Commission partially reversed
itself again, however, when it refused to integrate private-to-public
transactions, such as PIPEs and AB exchange offers,2' and public-to-
private transactions such as failed public offerings which turn into Reg-
ulation D offerings after the mandatory six-month waiting period to
avoid integration.2 67
260. Id. at 7.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 7 & n.13; see Limited Partnership Rollup Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L
No. 103-202, 107 Stat. 2344 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78f, 78n, 78o-3 (1994)).
264. Keller, supra note 257, at 7.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 9; see infra notes 324-33 and accompanying text (describing PIPEs and
AB exchange offers).
267. Keller, supra note 257, at 9-10; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1996).
b. The problem of gun-jumping: An example of section 5
hypertechnicality
Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act bars any attempt to offer or sell a securi-
ty before the effective date of its registration statement.2" Offering or
selling before this date is commonly referred to as gun-jumping.26 The
Commission's ambiguous treatment of considering only some pre-of-
fering solicitations as gun-jumping, together with the Commission's
proposal to eliminate the prohibition on pre-offering solicitations alto-
gether, suggest that section 5(c) may be headed toward obsolescence.
Traditionally, the Commission construed section 5(c) as a broad pro-
hibition on a variety of preregistration marketing activities, even disal-
lowing issuers from distributing estimates of their assets or the value of
the offered securities.27 Although the Commission rigorously enforces
section 5(c) and clamps down on these forms of gun-jumping, its re-
cently proposed Rule 135(d)27" ' would allow widespread solicitation of
investors before an issuer files a registration statement for an initial
public offering of the issuer's securities.272 Proposed Rule 135(d)
would allow a company to solicit written or oral "indications of inter-
est" in its securities to "test the waters" before preparing a registration
statement for an IPO under the 1933 Act.2 "h The Commission argued
that allowing issuers to evaluate potential buyer interest before incur-
ring the costs of registration would help the issuers avoid the costly
and inefficient situation of venturing into the market only to find insuf-
ficient interest in the offering.274
268. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994).
269. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (defining gun-jumping). See gen-
erally Joseph P. Richardson & Joseph E. Reece, Gun Jumping, 26 REv. SEC. & COM-
MODrI2s REG. 1 (1993).
270. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
271. See Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Securities Act
Release No. 7188, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 85,639, at 86,885
(June 27, 1995) [hereinafter Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering
Release].
272. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1152; see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF,
EMERGING TRENDS IN SEcurrmEs LAw 3-3 to 3-5, 3-19 (1995).
273. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1152; see Stephen I. Glover, In Proposals Designed for
Small Businesses, the SEC Would Permit Issuers to 'Test the Waters" and Would
Shorten Holding Periods for Restricted Securities, NAT'L UJ., Aug. 21, 1995, at B6;
Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering Release, supra note 271. A
test the waters rule has been available for issuers using the Regulation A registration
exemption since 1992, but only 61 issuers have actually attempted these pre-offering
solicitations under the rule. Glover, supra, at B6 n.6.
274. Glover, supra note 273, at B6. Proposed Rule 135(d) is designed primarily for
smaller issuers such as companies with little resources to evaluate demand for their
securities, for which a thwarted venture into the market could spell financial disaster.
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Issuers would need to file solicitations of interest under Rule 135(d),
whether written or oral, with the Commission prior to the actual solici-
tation, but the staff would not review the solicitations.275 The issuer
would be subject to liability for misrepresentations under section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act (but not section 12(2)) and section 10(b) of the 1934
Act.276 These provisions would likely allow typical selling hyperbole
but ward off serious fraud.2" Finally, Rule 135(d) would require solici-
tations to describe the issuer and its business, provide the chief execu-
tive officer's name, and include certain disclaimers.2" The issuer could
include other disclosures at its own election.'
Proposed Rule 135(d) represents the Commission's implicit abandon-
ment of section 5(c) in favor of new approaches to solicitation that
take into account the realities of modem capital raising.' Section
5(c) was formulated to make the prospectus the foremost, and for a
time the only, source of information about the new issue available to a
purchaser." Section 5(c) was designed to ensure that the investor re-
ceived credible, complete disclosure regarding the security and the
issuer, instead of the slanted and often incomplete information the
investor might receive in a direct pre-offering solicitation.' Rule
135(d) goes far beyond allowing mere feasibility testing of the offering,
which could be accomplished by a narrower solicitation to institutional
investors or underwriters, and allows issuers to effectively market the
Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. The history of the test the waters rule for Regulation A seems to indicate this,
for "significant amounts of puffery" were tolerated under that system. Id.; see Leonard
J. McGill, Innovative New California Transactional Exemption for Sales to Qualified
Purchasers, INSIGHTS, May 1995, at 23, 24.
278. Glover, supra note 273, at B6. Required disclaimers include the following state-
ments: "The solicitation is not an offering of securities; any public offering will be
made only by means of a prospectus; no money is being solicited or accepted; no
sales will be made or commitments to purchase accepted until a registration state-
ment is filed and becomes effective or until an exemption from registration is used;
and indications of interest do not involve a commitment of any kind." Id.; see Solici-
tations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering Release, supra note 271.
279. Glover, supra note 273, at B6. Optional disclosures may include "information
about the type, amount and price of the securities to be offered, audited or unaudit-
ed financial statements, projections and other forward-looking financial information."
Id.
280. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1153.
281. Id. at 1160-51, 1153.
282. Id. at 1151, 1153.
security to the general public prior to filing the registration state-
ment.ss
Whether or not the Commission adopts proposed Rule 135(d), the
character of this kind of proposal demonstrates that the Commission is
ready to significantly modify or abandon many basic concepts once
considered indispensable to the Securities Act of 1933. The
Commission's call for comments prior to the Advisory Committee Re-
port persuasively reveals this phenomenon.' The change of heart by
the Commission, along with the growing number of calls by companies
for deregulation of the capital raising process, signals a need for a com-
prehensive new system of integrated disclosure based on company reg-
istration.'s
The Commission's gun-jumping experience has led some commenta-
tors to conclude that the combination of the Commission's recent hy-
perliteral interpretation of the language of the 1933 Act and its Pro-
posed Rule 135(d)' have produced inconsistent and undesirable re-
283. Id. at 1152-53. For this reason, Professor Coffee suggests that the Commission
may be signaling, as Eric Chiappinelli argues, that section 5(c) is outmoded and
should be scrapped to allow for more aggressive marketing in modem capital mar-
kets. Id. at 1153; see Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous
Offers of Securities, 50 U. Prrr. L REV. 457, 497-501 (1989).
284. Steven M.H. Wallman specifically called for comments to the Commission ad-
dressing the following questions:
1. Does the current regulatory scheme, with its focus on the registration of
securities offerings rather than on the issuers of those securities, strike an
appropriate balance between the capital-raising needs of companies and the
disclosure needs of investors? Also, are investors' informational needs now
being served by the existing prospectus disclosure and delivery requirements
applicable to public offerings?
2. To what extent are issuers' financing decisions influenced by regulatory
rather than financial and market considerations? What factors specifically
influence a company's choice of public, private, or other capital-raising tech-
niques, whether in the United States or abroad?
3. How have companies adapted their marketing, disclosure and other policies
or practices to address regulatory and market uncertainties? Would movement
to a company registration scheme, or some other alternate model, reduce or
remove any of these uncertainties?
4. Would significant streamlining or elimination of the present transactional
registration scheme affect the due diligence exercised by underwriters and
corporate officials in connection with the preparation of offering documents
and/or other communications with investors?
5. Would adoption of alternative regulatory models-whether company regis-
tration or aspects of systems used in other countries-have any impact on
the integrity of the nation's securities markets and the incidence of fraud?
See Wallman, supra note 233, at 3.
285. See ADVISORY COMMrrEE REPoRT, supra note 1, app. A at 35-36.
286. See Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering Release, supra
600
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sults. 7 Gerald S. Backman and Stephen E. Kim contend that the
Commission has most recently engaged in "a hypertechnical reading of
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1 93 3 ."s This
metaphysical approach, according to Backman and Kim, is a result of
"stretching the aim of the Securities Act... to cover situations for
which such protection may not be necessary."' The result is an in-
consistent interpretation of section 5 of the 1933 Act and uncertainty as
to the results the proposed changes will produce in a given situation.
Backman and Kim use three hypotheticals to demonstrate the current
inconsistency. First, if an issuer conducts a limited registered offering
to a small group of investors who do not have a plan for secondary
redistribution, the securities sold in the second transaction do not bear
resale restrictions and may be freely traded by the investors. Sec-
ond, if the same investors demand a registered issuance (defined by
Backman and Kim as a "filing of a registration statement for the securi-
ties") prior to the sale in order to obtain freely tradable securities, the
Commission might interpret the issuer's offer as a form of gun-jumping
because it was made prior to filing the registration statement under
section 5.2"I Finally, if the issuer sells the securities to the investors
note 271, at 86,885.
287. See Coffee, supra note 4, at B4; BLOOMENTHAL & WoLFF, supra note 272, at 3-1
to 3-2. According to Stanley Keller, the SEC "staffs positions reflect a return to a
more literalist approach to applying the Securities Act and a departure from the
flexible and pragmatic attitudes that have characterized the Division for well over a
decade." Keller, supra note 257, at 5; SEC v. Arvida, 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); see Chiappinelli, supra note 283, at 499-501.
Professor Coffee argues that the recent positions of Commission staff further
indicate "the statutory obsolescence" of the Securities Act of 1933:
Statutory norms that only a decade ago were treated as inviolate are now
being distinguished away when policy reasons suggest that compliance with
them would be costly. If the high priests of securities law-the staff of the
SEC-have lost faith in the old dogma, the question naturally arises whether
others should still adhere to the old dogma's premises.
Coffee, supra note 7, at 1149-50.
288. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 18.
289. Id.
290. Id. The Commission's pronouncement in American Council of Life Insurance,
SEC No-Action Letter, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 77,526,
at 78,641 (May 10, 1983) (hereinafter American Council of Life Insurance], put to rest
the "presumptive underwriter doctrine" and limited the definition of an underwriter to
brokers and those obtaining a security for the purpose of redistributing it in the
secondary market Id.
291. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 18.
via a section 4(2) private placement and subsequently files a resale
Form S-3, Rule 152' allows the transaction.2 This is the PIPE
transaction.9 4
Two other hypothetical situations illustrate more problems with the
Commission's recent positions on gun-jumping.2e First, suppose an
issuer begins a private placement of securities under an applicable ex-
emption, but after failing to find the requisite private support, decides
instead to conduct a public offering.'e The prior contacts with private
investors before filing the registration statement for the public offering
is a form of gun-jumping-an offer of securities before the effective
date of the registration statement.297 Next, suppose an issuer tries to
conduct a public offering, sends a prospectus to potential investors, but
does not attract enough interest and the offering fails.'s If the issuer
then decides to try a private offering, the Commission may consider the
prospectus to investors a "general solicitation" rendering the private
placement exemption inapplicable, thereby foreclosing the opportunity
of a private offering.2 9
c. Decline of the traditional prospectus
While the Commission's inconsistency regarding gun-jumping implied
a move away from section 5, its recent positions on preliminary and
final prospectus delivery fail to indicate a full-scale retreat from tradi-
tional 1933 Act disclosure." ° Despite the free writing prohibition that
restricts issuers from using any written solicitation of investors other
than the preliminary prospectus, the Commission recently allowed
"term sheets," which are brief descriptions of the issuance and the issu-
er, underlying assets, and the loans involved, in asset-backed securities
292. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1996).
293. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 18. Rule 152 preserves availability of the
section 4(2) exemption for the private placement regardless of whether it is followed
by a public distribution or if the issuer received "binding commitments" from the
investors before the registration statement was filed. Id.
294. Id.; see Keller, supra note 257, at 6-7, 9; see also infra notes 324-26 and 333
and accompanying text (describing PIPE transactions as a new form of equity instru-
ment designed to evade section 5 registration).
295. BLOOMENTHAL & WoLFF, supra note 272, at 3-3 to 3-5.
296. Id. at 3-3 to 3-4.
297. Id. at 3-4.
298. Id. at 3-33 to 3-34.
299. Id. "A fundamental basis for the private offering exemption, . is the absence
of general solicitation of investors." Keller, supra note 257, at 6.
300. See Distribution of Certain Material Relating to Asset-Backed Securities, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 77,008 (Feb. 17,
1995) [hereinafter Distribution of Certain Material Relating to Asset-Backed Securities].
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issuances prior to the effective date." Although the issuer must file
these term sheets with the Commission prior to using the sheets,'
they certainly do not qualify as a preliminary prospectus as envisioned
by the 1933 Act, and their permitted use represents further weakening
of section 5 by the Commission.'
The Commission also jettisoned the requirement that the issuers
deliver the prospectus to investors as a single document at or before
the closing.'m Rule 434 allows issuers to deliver the prospectus infor-
mation piecemeal to investors at different times, so long as the issuer
delivers all required information at or before the final settlement
date. 5 Rule 430A,' as recently amended by the Commission in
1995, permits issuers to omit information about the offering price and
underwriting arrangements from the final prospectus, allowing issuers
to fie the information with the Commission within fifteen business
days. 7 Thus, in the interest of saving tine and money, an issuer can
break the final prospectus, which is designed to be the central selling
document of Securities Act disclosure, and distribute it to the investor
over time.'m The collateral result is that the investor's decision to buy
may occur long before the last piece of the prospectus arrives, render-
ing the final prospectus largely irrelevant in the investor's deci-
sionmaking process.'m
301. See id. An earlier no-action letter allowed use of "computational materials,"
essentially computer-generated graphs and charts outlining possible returns on invest-
ment and characteristics of the underlying assets, in securities issuances. See Mort-
gage and Asset-Backed Securities--Furnishing Information to Customers, SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCI) 76,941 (May 20,
1994).
302. See Distribution of Certain Material Relating to Asset-Backed Securities, supra
note 300, at 78,939.
303. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1153.
304. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.434 (1996).
305. Id.
306. Id. § 230.430A(a)(3) (1996).
307. See Prospectus Delivery; Securities Transaction Settlement, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 7168 11995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH 85,620 at 56,568
(May 11, 1995).
308. Professor Coffee noted that the decision to compromise the statutory language
in favor of saving time and money (here, in light of the T + 3 settlement date) plac-
es the Commission on the "slippery slope" of using cost and time considerations to
excuse erosion of the 1933 Act. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1154 & n.34.
309. See id. at 1154 (noting the Commission's willingness to accept prospectus ma-
terial after sales have been made to investors).
Moreover, the prospectus delivery requirement has become nearly
irrelevant in the shelf registration scenario because investors receive
little information in the truncated Form S-3 prospectus and rely almost
wholly on the issuer's 1934 Act reports for needed information about
the issuer and the offering."' With the advent of the Electronic Data
Gathering Analysis and Retrieval System (EDGAR), electronic disclo-
sure, and Internet filings, some commentators felt that Form S-3 signi-
fied the beginning of an administrative repeal of the traditional prospec-
tus delivery requirement as codified in the 1933 Act, and this view
should take much firmer root in light of the Advisory Committee
Report."'
3. Increase in Offerings and Instruments Outside Section 5
a. Private placements and Rule 144
Increasingly, investors are forsaking traditional public offerings under
the 1933 Act in favor of popular, and often less costly, alternatives to
raising capital." The private placement exemption, for example, has
never been more attractive to issuers in light of the recent Supreme
Court ruling holding the liability provisions of section 11 and section
12(2) of the 1933 Act inapplicable to private placement issuers,3 and
the Commission's proposed rule reducing the holding period for re-
stricted securities under Rule 144 of the 1933 Act to one year."4 With
these and other recent developments, "[i]nstitutional investors and is-
suers are threatening to obliterate the demarcation between public
offerings and private placements.""'
The Commission proposed a rule which would further encourage the
use of private placements by establishing shorter holding periods under
310. Id. at 1160.
311. See id. at 1162-63 (suggesting that the confirmation of sale could become the
new prospectus in a company registration system); ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPoRT, su-
pra note 1, app. B at 27 (suggesting that under company registration system, prospec-
tus delivery may soon be unnecessary 'in all but extraordinary circumstances"); Jo-
seph McLaughlin, SEC Approves Use of Electronic Prospectuses and Proposes T + 3
Relief, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1995, at 3; see also inj-7a notes 403 and 493 and accompanying
text (discussing the Advisory Committee proposal to make the confirmation of sale
serve as the prospectus in the proposed company registration system).
312. See infra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
313. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
314. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rule 144; Section 16(A) Re-
porting of Equity Swaps and Other Derivative Securities, Securities Act Release No.
7187, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 85,638 (June 27, 1995) [here-
inafter Rule 144 Release].
315. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 14; see ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1,
app. A at 45-57.
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Rule 144 of the 1933 Act."8 Under current Rule 144(d), buyers may
resell restricted securities obtained in private placements after a two-
year holding period, within specified volume limits, and in "ordinary
brokerage transactions," provided that the issuer first made public the
required details about the company's business and the issuance.311
After three years, these securities currently can be sold freely without
informational or other requirements.3"' Under similar prerequisites ap-
plicable to qualification under the two-year holding period of the Rule,
the Commission's proposed rule would shorten the holding period to
one year and shorten the unrestricted resale holding period from three
years to two."9 The Commission justified the proposed change by
pointing to the cost and risk borne by most investors buying in private
placements under Rule 144, and noting that it designed the change to
reduce these costs and make Rule 144 "more useful. " "° The Commis-
sion further observed that the one-year holding period should be ade-
quate to ensure that investors buying securities under Rule 144 do not
intend to make any public redistribution of those securities."
The proposed change to Rule 144 would benefit small companies the
most, because they stand to gain significantly from the encouragement
of private placements and the reduction of the discount needed to mar-
ket those securities.2 This change should facilitate stock-based acqui-
sitions because unregistered, privately placed stock would require only
316. See Rule 144 Release, supra note 314, at 85,638.
317. 17 C.F.R. 230.144(d) (1995). The investor selling pursuant to Rule 144 re-
quirements is not treated as an underwriter, and any resale by such a person is enti-
tled to the section 4(1) exemption for sales by persons other than an issuer, its
agents, or its underwriters. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1994). Glover, supra note 273, at B6.
The holding period "is designed to establish that the owner did not purchase with a
view to public distribution." Id.
318. Glover, supra note 273, at B6.
319. Id.; see Rule 144 Release, supra note 314, at 85,638.
320. Glover, supra note 273, at B6; see Rule 1'14 Release, supra note 314, at
85,638. Issuers placing securities in private placements governed by Rule 144 often
must reduce the price of those securities by as much as 2596 to compensate investors
for the risk they incur in holding the security during the Rule's two-year holding
period. Glover, supra note 273, at B6; see ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1,
app. A at 46 & n.47 (estimating a 2096 "illiquidity" discount in most private place-
ments).
321. Glover, supra note 273, at B6; see Rule 144 Release, supra note 314, at 85,
638.
322. Glover, supra note 273, at B6.
the one-year holding period and would be more valuable to stockhold-
ers of the target company.'s
b. PIPE transactions and AB exchange offers
One particularly interesting consequence of the increase in private
placements is the development of the private investment-public equity
transaction. In a PIPE transaction, the buyer agrees to purchase securi-
ties offered in a private placement on the condition that the issuer im-
mediately fie a resale Form S-3 registration statement.' The parties
then agree not to close the sale until the Commission declares the re-
sale registration statement effective. 5 According to Stanley Keller, is-
suers have made liberal use of the PIPE transaction to sell freely mar-
ketable securities without enduring the rigors and time delays of full
1933 Act registration." 8
Another capital raising instrument, the AB exchange offer, allows a
purchaser to acquire securities in an unregistered private placement and
immediately trade them for registered securities from the issuer. 7
Though the Commission has strictly construed the parameters of per-
missible AB exchange offers, it is clear that these offers are another
viable way for issuers to immediately sell marketable securities without
the burdens of traditional registration."s
323. Id.
324. Keller, supra note 257, at 9.
325. Id. The Commission declared PIPE transactions acceptable, so long as (1) the
private offering is "completed"-all conditions precedent to the sale are outside the
buyers' control-before the resale registration statement is filed, and (2) no further
negotiations occur between the issuer and the buyers after the Commission declares
the resale registration statement effective. Id.; see Black Box, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 79,510, at 77,571 (June 26,
1990).
326. Keller, supra note 257, at 9.
327. See Exxon Capital Holdings Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234336 (May
13, 1988); see also Stanley Keller, Current Issues in Private Placements: Pri-
vate/Public Offerings, 933 P.Ll./CORP. 9, 9, 15, 22-23 (1996).
328. Keller, supra note 327, at 22. Through a series of no-action letters following
the Exxon Capital letter, the Commission confined the AB exchange offer to use in
various preferred stock offerings, nonconvertible debt, and IPOs by foreign issuers,
suggesting that foreign companies may be able to completely evade section 5 in the
situation for which it is best designed. the IPO. See Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 76,018, at
78,884 (June 5, 1991); K-Ill Comm. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 166858
(May 14, 1993); Corimon C.A. S.A.C.A., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 97703 (Mar.
22, 1993); Vitro, S.A., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 1 76,072, at 78,083 (Nov. 19, 1991); Epic Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1991 WL 216064 (Oct. 21, 1991); Warnaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991
WL 209850 (Oct. 11, 1991); Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-
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Moreover, also as a result of issuers and investors seeking to avoid
the burdens of section 5, offshore offerings under Regulation S' have
increased significantly.'e Modem technology and increased interaction
among global capital markets have made offshore offerings an attractive
alternative for issuers who wish to raise capital quickly and efficiently
without the costs of registration. 1 Holding periods for these securi-
ties can be as short as forty days for foreign investors under applicable
exemptions, allowing a quick "flowback" of these securities into the
U.S. market-all without the protections of section 5.'
The increased use of AB exchange offers, PIPE transactions, and
offshore offerings casts considerable doubt on the usefulness of the
public-private distinction and provides clear evidence that modem in-
vestors increasingly choose to go around the 1933 Act instead of work-
ing within its aging dictates.' One effect of this flight from traditional
registration may be further circumvention of adequate disclosure to
investors concerning these issues, in direct opposition to the main prin-
ciples underlying the Securities Act.
c. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.'0
A recent Supreme Court holding makes private placement securities
even more attractive than securities traditionally registered under the
1933 Act. In Gustafson v. AUoyd Co., the Court held that only public
offerings, and not private placements, are subject to the "negligence
1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 76,016, at 78,887 (June 5, 1991).
329. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1996).
330. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 47-48.
331. Id.
332. Id. app. A at 54-66. Increasingly, issuers are using the offshore offering as a
tool to flaunt registration requirements entirely; issuers temporarily place securities
offshore to "wash" them of any resale restrictions through Regulation S, while true
ownership and risk-bearing remains in the United States. Id. app. A at 55-56 & n.63,
64; see Problematic Practices Under Regulation S, Securities Act Release No. 7190,
[General Guide] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 3059C (June 27, 1995); see also Jaye
Schol, Easy Money: How Foreign Investors Profit at the Expense of Americans, an
Invitation to Scamsters?, BARRON'S, Apr. 29, 1996, at 31.
333. Keller, supra note 257, at 6-7. In the typical PIPE transaction, investors condi-
tion the securities purchase on the resale statement being effective at the time of
sale, producing a further "blurring of the distinction between public and private of-
ferings in the marketplace." Id. at 6, 9.
334. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
standard" of section 12(2) of the Securities Act." In Gustafson, the
Gustafson defendants sold nearly all of the stock they owned in Alloyd
Co. (Alloyd) to plaintiff Wind Point Partners II, LP. (Wind Point)
through a private contract of sale, which included an estimation of the
expected increase in Alloyd's value above the previous year's figures by
the time of sale in the purchase price.' When the increase in Alloyd's
value turned out to be lower than expected, Wind Point sued the
Gustafson defendants, seeking rescission under section 12(2) of the
1933 Act for making material misstatements in a securities prospec-
tus." The Court held that the private contract of sale did not con-
stitute a prospectus under the 1933 Act and refused to extend section
12(2) liability to private placements outside section 5 of the 1933
Act.' The Court emphasized that only misstatements in a formal pro-
spectus issued in conjunction with a traditional public offering under
the 1933 Act could be subject to the rescission remedy of section 12(2)
and a private investment contract is not a prospectus to which liability
could attach.' 9
In removing liability for negligent misstatements in private place-
ments, Gustafson creates a particularly strong incentive for issuers to
turn to the private placement as a means of raising capital while mini-
mizing liability, even in spite of the concomitant restrictions on distribu-
tion of securities sold in private placements to secondary markets." °
Margaret Bancroft suggests that the increased attractiveness of private
placements will lead to liberalization of holding requirements and other
distribution restrictions surrounding securities sold in these place-
ments." 1 If this were to happen, "the marketplace will have, in effect,
dismissed the Securities Act as irrelevant with respect to seasoned
issuers and the integrity of the Act will be compromised. "342 Given
that private placements were already a popular method of raising capi-
335. Id. at 1072-73.
336. Id. at 1064-65.
337. Id. at 1065.
338. Id. at 1067-69.
339. Id. at 1067.
340. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 14-15. Bancroft suggests that this is partially be-
cause, after Gustolson, "participants in private placements are no longer liable for
negligent misstatements in any meaningful way." Id. at 15.
341. Id. at 15.
342. Id.
The rigors of registration under the Securities Act and review by the SEC
staff, coupled with a thorough review by underwriters, is invaluable in the
context of capital raisings that serve to take a company public. The scrutiny
given new issuers by regulators, investment bankers, lawyers and accountants
works as a rite of passage.
Id. at 15 n.9
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tal for investors and companies interested in avoiding registration be-
fore Gustafson, the Court's decision will only serve to push more inves-
tors toward nonregistered private placements.3'
IV. Tim CALL FOR COMPANY REGISTRATION
The idea of company registration stems from the philosophy that
public offerings of securities will be made easier and more efficient in a
unified, results-oriented disclosure system.' Some observers view
company registration as the next logical step in a historical progression
that is driven by increasing reliance on the 1934 Act to adequately in-
form investors and the market in general, and de-emphasizing or cir-
cumventing 1933 Act registration.3" Ideally, this system would be
geared toward facilitating capital raising and free marketability of secu-
rities, while abandoning attempts to preserve hypertechnical distinc-
tions between 1933 and 1934 Act disclosure; yet, as commentators
readily admit, different investors will want different things out of a new
company registration system.3m Investors and issuers stand to gain
from the increased certainty of a unified system which arguably would
improve the quality of disclosure across the board. 7 Given full or
343. Id. at 14-15.
344. See Wallman, supra note 233, at 2.
345. According to Bancroft, company registration "[glives logical recognition to the
increased role Exchange Act filings have come to play in promoting the federal phi-
losophy of disclosure," and "reflects the ultimate ascendancy of Exchange Act disclo-
sure over that of the Securities Act." Bancroft, supra note 16, at 15. See generally
Integrated Disclosure System Release, supra note 202; Edward F. Greene et al., Hege-
mony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Mar-
kets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413 (1995).
346. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 1147; Wallman, supra note 233, at 2-3.
Wallman argues that the primary goal of any company registration system should be
to allow companies to raise capital when and where it is needed, without the undue
delay imposed by duplicative disclosure or the vagaries of the Commission's frequent
reinterpretation of disclosure requirements. Wallman, supra note 231, at 2-3. Coffee
predicts that other investors will favor a system that abolishes the chaotic set of
registration exemptions that have grown up around the 1933 Act Coffee, supra note
7, at 1147.
347. Wallman, supra note 233, at 3. A unified negligence standard governing all
periodic transactions under the 1934 Act, combined with certain safe harbor provi-
sions for issuers acting in reasonable reliance on experts, should provide a greater
incentive than the current scienter liability of section 10(b) for issuers to provide full
disclosure. See infra notes 371-78 and accompanying text (discussing Bancroft's new
negligence standard for a company registration system).
substantial market participation, a system of company registration has
the potential to revolutionize the capital raising process and accommo-
date the fast-moving 'ecurities markets of the Electronic Age.'
Backman and Kim have proposed "virtual elimination of registration
for seasoned companies based on reliance on integrated disclosure," 9
while Bancroft has proposed a new negligence standard applicable to
public offerings which would reduce the liability concerns surrounding
section 11 of the 1933 Act.' ° Michael Occhiolini has proposed an al-
ternative system involving the registration of companies based on "qual-
ified issuer lists," while eliminating the concept of restricted securi-
ties." Each model has its advantages and disadvantages, but each
represents a significant improvement over the inconsistent patchwork
of statutory and administrative disclosure law currently in effect.
A. Backman-Kim Model
Backman and Kim suggest reforming the current disclosure system to
allow "seasoned" issuers to offer and sell securities upon submitting a
short "registration statement" to the Commission similar to Form S-3,
containing summary information about the issue and incorporating
many 1934 Act disclosures by reference." The proposed system as-
sumes that continuous disclosure under the 1934 Act can protect mod-
em investors because transactional disclosure under the 1933 Act large-
ly duplicates information already disclosed to the market.' To reme-
dy the inconsistencies created by the Commission's metaphysical ap-
proach to the 1933 Act, Backman and Kim recommend abolishing 1933
Act registration for most publicly traded companies in all offerings
except IPOs and replacing it with an optional company registration that
streamlines the typical registration statement and reconstructs the tra-
ditional prospectus.'
348. Nevertheless, Wallman cautioned that "under any new system of disclosure,
market integrity must be maintained and investors must remain as fully protected as
they are today." Wallman, supra note 233, at 3. He added that "the success of such
a system would depend on issuers' willingness to use it if the current registration
process also were to remain available." Id,
349. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 18.
350. See Bancroft, supra note 15, at 15-16.
351. See Michael Occhiolini, Where to Draw the Line: Distinguishing Between Re-
stricted and Publicly Registered Securnties in an Era of Equity Swaps, I STAN. J.L
Bus. & FIN. 209, 233-35 (1995).
352. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 20-21.
353. Id.; see JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 50; Cohen, supra note 31, at 1342.
354. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 20-21. Abandoning the 1933 Act registra-
tion would likely eliminate most practical distinctions between public and private
offerings and render private placement exemptions largely obsolete. Id. at 20.
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To be eligible for participation in the company registration system,
issuers would need to meet the eligibility requirements for Form S-3'
and have their securities listed on a national stock exchange or
NASDAQ (thus embracing companies subject to 1934 Act reporting).'
The registration statement in the Backman-Kim model serves as a sim-
ple notice to the Commission of the possible sale of a certain class or
type of security. 7 The Commission would consider the registration
statement effective when filed, thus the statement registers the entire
class of securities simultaneously.' The issuer would not be subject
to an initial filing fee, but would be assessed a fee at the time of issu-
ance and would be required to send an updated form to the Commis-
sion specifying the value of each type of security sold.'
Similarly, the Backman-Kim prospectus would consist of the final
confirmation of sale and certain 1934 Act disclosures incorporated by
reference, and the issuer would not need to file the prospectus with the
Commission.' Backman and Kim suggest that the prospectus may al-
355. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (1996) (allowing certain issuers to use form S-3 for registra-
tion).
356. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 20. Backman and Kim would extend sys-
tem coverage to all publicly listed companies, but would not impose the Form S-3
primary offering requirement of a $75 million public float. Id. Their proposed system
might also cover secondary offerings and offerings in connection with acquisitions,
but likely would not work well with Form S-4 acquisition offerings or complicated
asset-backed and structured securities. Id. at 20 n.25.
357. Id. at 20.
358. Id. This would remedy the typical overhang problem experienced by issuers us-
ing S-3 shelf registration, whereby the market stays away from the shelf-registered
security for fear of future dilution by unannounced additional offerings up to the
registered dollar amount. Id. at 20-21.
359. Id. at 20. Backman and Kim do not specify how the fee should be calculated,
although logic suggests that it cannot be a direct function of the number or value of
securities registered to be sold as in the current system-the Backman-Kim system
envisions registration of an indefinite number of securities. Id. The best solution may
be a flat, one-time fee minimizing the amount of administrative hassle associated with
periodic fee assessments based on every additional issuance. Id. Nevertheless, these
periodic fee assessments closely resemble the "situation in which listed companies
file original and supplemental listing applications with the stock exchanges, paying a
prescribed fee for all securities issued." Id. The flat, one-time fee suggestion would
comport best with the simplification of capital-raising envisioned under the Backman-
Kim system. For an explanation of the problems associated with fee calculation under
a company registration system, see Coffee, supra note 238, at B7.
360. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 20. This system would pass section 5
muster and essentially duplicate Rule 428, which provides that issuers need not file a
prospectus in conjunction with a Form S-8 offering. 17 C.F.I § 230.428(b)(1)(ii)
so require other information deemed material to investors in a typical
offering, such as "a description of any securities not previously regis-
tered under the Exchange Act, any 'underwriting' arrangements where a
market intermediary is involved, use of proceeds and any additional
information deemed necessary or desirable by the registrant for purpos-
es of marketing or otherwise." "
Under the Backman-Kim model, the fraud liability provisions of both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts apply to the new registration statement and
prospectus.' Section 11 of the 1933 Act would apply to any informa-
tion contained in the registration statement, while section 12(2) liability
would attach to the information disclosed in the prospectus.3,
Backman and Kim predict that under the Gustafson decision, "the pro-
spectus used in a transaction that would otherwise constitute a 'private
placement' presumably would be subject to liability only under section
12(2).-3u
The Backman-Kim model of company registration applies to all quali-
fying issuers, but is not mandatory across the board.' It allows issu-
ers to opt out if they desire.3" To ensure maximum use of the pro-
posed system, Backman and Kim impose a penalty on companies opting
out, such as barring them from participation in the new system for a
year. 7
The Backman-Kim model of company registration provides several
immediate advantages over the current system of disclosure. It elimi-
nates transactional disclosure entirely for seasoned issuers who are
most likely to be adversely affected by the inefficiency of duplicative
filings and the burdens of 1933 Act liability.' It imposes a higher
standard of liability on company disclosures under the 1934 Act, ensur-
(1996); Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 20.
361. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 20. Backman and Kim would generally
incorporate acquisition information by reference, not including it directly in the pro-
spectus. Id.
362. Id. For a more detailed discussion of negligence liability under a system of
company registration, see infra notes 371-78 and accompanying text, discussing
Bancroft's proposed negligence standard.
363. Backman & Kim, supm note 202, at 20.
364. Id. at 20 rL27. For a discussion of Gustafson, see supra notes 334-43 and ac-
companying text.
365. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 20.
366. Id. Despite Backman and Kim's view that the new system would be more
efficient and easier to use than the current system, they recognize that issuers may
want to remain under the current regime for many reasons, including the increase in
liability for 1934 Act reports and lower costs associated with traditional private place-
ments. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id at 19.
[VoL 24: 563, 1997] The Case for Company Registration
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ing the kind of complete disclosure enjoyed under the 1933 Act, but
without the inefficient overlapping disclosure and costs associated with
formally registering every public offering."n The Backman-Kim system
even improves on current shelf registration under Form S-3 by elimi-
nating market overhang and the use of underwriters in a primary equity
shelf offering.37 °
B. Bancroft's "New Negligence Standard"
According to Bancroft, issuers participating in any new company
registration system should agree to a new negligence standard based on
section 12(2) of the 1934 Act,37" ' applicable to 1934 Act filings and su-
perseding section 18 of the 1934 Act.3' The standard would apply the
section 12(2) brand of negligence liability to both formal security issu-
ances and everyday market purchases by investors.3 73
Bancroft, like Backman and Kim, envisions a voluntary company
registration system, where issuers can opt out in favor of remaining in
the current 1933/1934 Act system.374 Bancroft's proposed standard
would give issuers several reasons to stay. First, the new negligence
standard would be available only to issuers opting into the new system,
while section 11 of the 1933 Act would continue to impose strict liabili-
369. Id. at 20.
370. Id. As experience under Rule 144A and Regulation S has borne out, issuers
will probably continue to use underwriters for large distributions in order to better
market the security to potential investors. Id. at 21.
371. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a)(2) (1994).
372. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 15-16. Section 18 of the 1934 Act provides, in per-
tinent part:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any appli-
cation, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or
regulation thereunder ... which statement was at the time and in the light
of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with re-
spect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that
such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such state-
ment, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected
by such statement ... unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in
good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or mislead-
ing.
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1994). Bancroft considers this section a "dead letter," and urges
adoption of a new negligence standard to replace it. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 15.
373. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 15-16.
374. Id. at 16.
ty on all other companies for misrepresentations in the registration
statement.376 Second, to increase the attractiveness of staying in the
system and to soften the impact of expanded liability for continuous
disclosure, Bancroft would implement a safe harbor provision protect-
ing issuers and their agents who act in good faith reliance on experts in
determining what information they should reveal in their 1934 Act dis-
closures, as well as any registration statement and prospectus issued
within the company registration system.37 Third, investors would be
slow to participate in private placements governed only by the bare
scienter requirement of Rule lOb-5, when the increased protection of a
negligence standard is available under the new system.3" Finally, the
new negligence standard would substantially improve the quality of
disclosure under the 1934 Act, attracting more investors and driving up
the value of securities exchanged under the new system.37
C. The Occhiolini Model: Qualified Issuer Lists
Occhiolini's proposal to register companies through the use of a qual-
ified issuer list, thus doing away with the idea of restricted securities
entirely, is an innovative alternative to the Backman-Kim and Bancroft
company registration models." Occhiolini observed that regulation
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts is based on an assumption that an inves-
tor is the "owner" of a security, and thus bears the potential risk in
buying or selling it.'a The rise of equity swaps"i and other deriva-
tives challenge this fundamental assumption and the foundations for
today's system of disclosure.'
375. Id. Under the new negligence standard, issuers could claim protection from
misrepresentations based on their exercise of reasonable care, a compelling incentive
to not opt out of the new system. Id.
376. Id. This safe harbor would ensure that review of 1934 Act documents under a
new company registration system would "replicate, to the extent practical, the valu-
able, critical review process associated with long-form Securities Act filings." Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See Occhiolini, supra note 351, at 233.
380. Id. at 209.
381. Equity swaps are a type of contract ("swap contract") between two investors
wherein they agree to periodically "swap" cash flows resulting from certain invest-
ments. Id. at 211-12. The swap occurs under an arrangement where one investor pays
the other a fixed or variable interest rate on a sum certain, in exchange for the
other investor paying the first a rate of return on an equity or group of equities in
the market Id. An in-depth analysis of equity swaps is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but for a discussion of equity swaps, see generally Bernard J. Karol, An
Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FN. 195
(1995).
382. Occhiolini, supra note 351, at 209. With equity swaps, investing risk is borne
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Under Occhiolini's approach, based on the Wheat Report findings,'
a company registration system could be based upon registration of
companies on a Qualified Issuer List similar to that envisioned in the
proposed rules of the Wheat Report 160 series. 4 The list would con-
tain all companies reporting under the 1934 Act.' This allows inves-
tors to buy and sell freely without regard to whether the securities
were obtained in a traditional private placement or public offering.'
The prospectus would actually be a form similar to the Form S-3 regis-
tration statement, but would include information about the issuer and
its previous securities distributions rather than security-specific infor-
mation. 7 As in the Backman-Kim model, the prospectus could incor-
porate by reference previous 1934 Act disclosures. 3 These disclo-
sures would enable the Commission to continually review the
company's disclosures to ensure that the information was materially
complete.'
Despite the theoretical consistency of a company registration system,
Occhiolini is quick to articulate that bringing such a system to practical
reality would involve significant problems.' ° Disclosure under a com-
pany registration system might fall short of the rigorous and exacting
by investors other than the traditional owner, because these investors may or may
not be adequately informed of disclosure by the owner. Id. at 210. Thus, the disclo-
sure laws do not always act to protect these investors one or more levels removed
from "ownership" in the accepted use of the word. Id. at 209-10. The Federal Re-
serve Board's response to this inadequacy has been to oppose new regulation of
derivatives without a more broad-based overhaul of the financial system. See State-
ments to Congress: Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan's Speech to
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, in 80 FED. RES. BuLL 594,
603 (1994).
383. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 196.
384. Occhiolini, supra note 351, at 233-35. Rule 164 of the Wheat Report 160 series
would have established qualified issuer lists for purposes of reselling restricted securi-
ties, but the proposed rule ultimately was rejected in favor of what has become mod-
em Rules 144 and 144A. Id. at 217, 232. See genealy DAN L GOLDWASSER, A GUIDE
To RULE 144, app. B at 464 (1978) (describing qualified issuer lists under the Wheat
Report 160 series of proposed rules).
385. Occhiolini, supra note 351, at 232-33.
386. Id. at 232 (citing GOLDWASSER, supra note 384, at 460).
387. Id. at 234. The company would also have a duty to update the prospectus if
later circumstances materially changed the information initially provided to the inves-
tor. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
disclosure elicited by the current 1933 Act registration.39 Occhiolini's
model would also give the Commission power to suspend a company
from the Qualified Issuer List based on incomplete, misleading, or
fraudulent disclosure--a situation that could create market uncer-
tainty about which securities of a suspended issuer would be freely
tradable.' Further, companies traded on a national exchange but not
registered under the 1934 Act would need to develop a base of public
information similar to their registered counterparts in order for unified
1934 Act disclosure to adequately inform investors about these compa-
nies and their offerings.' Moreover, the system would force the Com-
mission to spend a large amount of time and money keeping the Quali-
fied Issuer List updated in order to maintain a current bank of data on
every publicly traded company for investors.' Finally, the Commis-
sion must reconcile any new system of company registration with state
blue sky laws, a task which may be too massive for the Commission to
undertake and too complicated for states to accommodate.9
According to Occhiolini, "the risk to the securities markets of finan-
cial instability that would result from such a fundamental change in the
regulation of securities under the [Securities] Acts" makes this pro-
posed company registration system inherently risky and politically pre-
carious.'
D. Coffee's "Re-Engineered" Disclosure System
Perhaps no other commentator's suggestions for a new company
registration system find as much representation in the Advisory
Committee's Report as those of committee member Professor John C.
Coffee, Jr. His proposal for a "re-engineering" of corporate disclosure
contains many of the ideas ultimately adopted by the Advisory Commit-
391. Id.
392. Proposed Rule 164 of the Wheat Report 160 series would have given the Com-
mission the power to remove a company from the List if it failed to provide ade-
quate disclosure under the 1934 Act. See WHEAT REPORT, supra noto 196, at app. VW-
1. Occhiolini incorporates this Rule into his proposed system of company registration.
Occhiolini, supra note 351, at 234.
393. Occhiolini, supra note 351, at 234.
394. Id. Under the current system, the 1933 Act provides the only meaningful dis-
closure about these companies, a significant hurdle for any proposed company regis-
tration system doing away with 1933 Act disclosure entirely. Id. Occhiolini suggests
that these companies, or all companies smaller than "a certain minimum size would
have to be excluded from the Qualified Issuer List for administrative cost and conve-
nience." Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 234-35.
397. Id. at 233.
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tee in its own proposed company registration system.' It is fair to
say that Professor Coffee's influence is clear in the final Advisory Com-
mittee Report's
Professor Coffee proposes a company registration system in which
qualified issuers register and file periodic reports under the 1934 Act,
allowing them later to conduct public offerings as needed without regis-
tering under the 1933 Act.4 ° The system requires only the submission
of a confirmation of sale, although the issuer could choose to distribute
a prospectus as a marketing tool so long as it conforms to the anti-
fraud provisions of the 1934 Act and does not make any false or mis-
leading statements or omit material information.4°' Recognizing that
1934 Act filings alone may not fully inform the average investor, Profes-
sor Coffee also urges certain "transaction specific" disclosure for situa-
tions in which it is necessary to convey certain material information not
already disclosed to the investor.4 This additional disclosure would
be Form 8-K, which the issuer would incorporate by reference into the
confirmation of sale to describe any new material developments or
changes to the issuer's capital structure caused by the offering.'
398. For example, Professor Coffee's recommendations for 8-K filings to supplement
issuer information and emphasis on the importance of underwriters as the gatekeep-
ers of disclosure quality appear throughout the Advisory Committee Report. Id. For a
discussion of the role of gatekeepers envisioned by the Advisory Committee, see
intfra notes 452-54, 468, 523-42 and accompanying text and Coffee, supra note 7, at
1155-76.
399. See Coffee, supm note 7, at 1155-76; infra notes 486-90 and accompanying text
(discussing adoption of Coffee's Form 8-K proposal).
400. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1155.
401. Id. at 1155, 1167.
402. Id. at 1166-67. For example, the current offering may indicate that the issuer is
completely changing its ownership, debt to equity ratio, or even its line of business.
Id. at 1167. This information may not appear in the issuer's 1934 Act reports and
would need to be disclosed in a Form 8-K filing. Id. Similarly, if the offering will
cause a significant change in the risk level associated with the issuer's stock, the is-
suer will be required to disclose this information on an 8-K prior to the offering Id.
at 1167-68.
403. Id. at 1166-67. Professor Coffee recommends this additional disclosure only
when the 1934 Act reports do not adequately describe some fundamental change to
the issuer's business as a result of the offering, and not as a general requirement for
all periodic market offerings. Id. The Advisory Committee Report adopted Professor
Coffee's Form 8-K recommendation, maling the 8-K filing mandatory for some public
offerings depending on their size. See iifra notes 486-90 and. accompanying text
(discussing the 8-K filing requirement in the proposed company registration pilot sys-
tem).
The main benefits of this proposed company registration system,
according to Professor Coffee, are (1) issuers' ability to go to market
quickly with a new offering and take advantage of short-term market
opportunities without waiting to file a registration statement or for staff
review, (2) reconciliation of Commission hypertechnicality in applying
section 5 concepts, (3) elimination of a formal prospectus requirement,
(4) enhancement of direct communication between the issuer and the
investor without Commission interference, and (5) a substantial reduc-
tion in issuer liability.' Professor Coffee warns that this last benefit
may impose the greatest cost on investors, to the extent that enhanced
issuer and controlling person liability promotes the quality of disclo-
sure."° As the liability of officers, directors, and underwriters is re-
laxed, Professor Coffee suggests less due diligence will be required of
these parties, and lower quality disclosure might result.4' The Com-
mission could address this quality problem by specifying additional due
diligence review requirements for underwriters and the issuer's officers
and agents, or more broadly, by imposing a general quality standard
upon all 1934 Act filings.0 7
Professor Coffee also warns of two potentially undesirable effects of
any company registration system: (1) a decline in the oversight role of
gatekeepers, and (2) accompanying changes in the market structure,
making it easier for issuers to sell directly to institutional purchasers
and bypass the underwriter completely.4° First, gatekeepers, who are
underwriters and other issuer agents that have little direct financial
interest in the offering but are "subject to special, and usually statutory,
liabilities that give [them] a strong incentive to monitor for law viola-
tions by others and little incentive to cheat itself,"41 face a potential
position of relative unimportance in a company registration system
because of the impossible time constraints associated with conducting
due diligence in short-term "at the market" offerings.1 ° Professor Cof-
404. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1155-56. The reduction in liability would ostensibly
come as a result of abolishing 1933 Act liability for company registration issuers and
applying only the liability provisions of the 1934 Act, most notably section 18 and
Rule 10b-5. Id. at 1156.
405. Id. at 1156-57.
406. Id. This result may be reflected in the "low-level attention" 1934 Act reports
typically receive compared with 1933 Act filings, exemplified by issuers who do not
have outside accountants or attorneys review the 10-Q or 8-K Forms, but instead
reserve such scrutiny for the annual financial statements. Id. at 1157.
407. Id. Even these measures, however, could impose substantial costs upon the is-
suer and its agents by forcing them to incur unwanted liability. Id.
408. Id. at 1168-70.
409. See id. at 1169 n.72; Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and
the Costs of Legal Control, 93 YALE U. 857, 890-91 (1984).
410. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1169-71. Many underwriters now complain they have
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fee argued that the Rule 415 requirement for the issuer to use an under-
writer makes little sense when the underwriter cannot possibly conduct
reasonable due diligence sufficient to discharge its gatekeeper role.41'
Second, the lack of any raison d'dtre for underwriters in a post-compa-
ny registration world as true gatekeepers would motivate issuers to sell
new issues directly to institutional investors, potentially destroying the
primary/secondary market distinction.1 2
Finally, Professor Coffee urged the Commission to relax section 11
liability in order to induce issuers to opt into a voluntary company
registration system.413 Professor Coffee predicts that most issuers will
be reluctant to participate in a company registration system if the issu-
er, its officers, directors, underwriters, and other agents may be subject
to expanded section 11 strict and vicarious liability based on the
issuer's continuous 1934 Act filings.414 Issuers may instead opt for pri-
vate placements and offshore offerings, in which the issuer is subject
only to Rule lOb-5 liability and can escape most section 11 and section
12(2) liability, and officers and directors may escape liability complete-
ly.41 ' The solution to this disincentive to enter a company registration
no time for proper due diligence review due to the short time frames of shelf trans-
actions. See Bancroft, supra note 15, at 14 & n.6; see also Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Seller's Due Diligence and Sim-
ilar Defenses Under the Federal Securities Laws, 48 Bus. LAW. 1185, 1206-07 (1993).
411. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1169-70. This situation arguably leads issuers to avoid
using shelf registration or company registration to the extent that these systems re-
quire use of an underwriter. Id. This conclusion is borne out by the emergence of
"bought deals," direct sales of securities from the issuer to a group of institutional
purchasers with little or no participation by an underwriter. Id. at 1169-70 & n.75; see
RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 584-85
(1992).
412. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1171-72.
413. Id. at 1172-76. Coffee noted that, as a threshold issue, it is unclear whether
administrative rulemaldng alone can effect real change to section 11 statutory liability,
especially given its poor fit with shelf registration in general. Id. at 1187. Legislative
reform, Coffee contends, is the ideal vehicle for addressing liability in a company
registration and for revamping section 11. Id.
414. Id. at 1172-73.
415. Id. at 1173 & n.83; see Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct 1061, 1065-71 (1995)
(finding no section 12(2) liability for documents provided in private placements); Cen-
tral Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 170-92 (1994) (finding no "aiding and
abetting" liability for directors and officers in private offerings outside section 5).
Professor Coffee argued that any company registration system must not be mandato-
ry, but rather "one alternative among others on a menu of options," in order to re-
tain the possible advantages of the current system of private exemptions and its
system may be to scale back section 11 liability in company registration
offerings by fortifying the due diligence safe harbor factors of Rule
176.41" The Commission could add a reasonable reliance defense to
the Rule 176 factors, providing the issuer and its directors with protec-
tion from section 11 liability if they reasonably relied on the investiga-
tions of a subcommittee of outside directors in determining the accura-
cy and completeness of 1934 Act disclosure.417 Additionally, the size of
the offering can be one of the Rule 176 factors considered in determin-
ing whether the issuer fulfilled due diligence.4"8 Thus, smaller offerings
would require correspondingly less investigation to be deemed reason-
able and to constitute a complete defense.4 9 In the end, Professor
Coffee noted that whatever requirements are imposed on company
registration should also be imposed on shelf registration, in order to
avoid the disincentive for current shelf issuers to switch to the new sys-
tem.
420
E. Legislative Deregulation of Securities Markets
The call for significant securities reform has come not only from the
Commission's Advisory Committee, but from Congress itself. In 1995,
Representative Jack Fields, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance, introduced H.R. 2131, The Capital
Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995,421 a bill which
would substantially overhaul many areas of modem securities regula-
tion, including prospectus delivery and standards for Commission
rulemaking, and which would grant exemptive authority to the Commis-
sion.4" H.R. 2131, known as the "Fields Bill," could set the stage for
better use of underwriters as gatekeepers. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1186.
416. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1175-76; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1995) (outlining cer-
tain factors that make up reasonable circumstances in ascertaining a defendant's com-
pliance with due diligence under section 11).
417. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1175-76. This defense seems to have been adopted by
the Advisory Committee, which recommended a similar reliance defense based on the
reasonable investigation of the issuer's audit committee or a disclosure committee.
See infra notes 513-42 and accompanying text (describing the recommendations of
the Advisory Committee Report regarding issuer liability and defenses).
418. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1175-76.
419. Id. at 1176.
420. Id. at 1186.
421. H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995).
422. See Deregulating Capital Markets: Hearings on H.R. 2131 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (Nov.
30, 1995), available in 1995 WL 12716028 (opening statement of Rep. Jack Fields (R-
Tex.), sponsor of H.R. 2131) [hereinafter Fields Testimony].
Other provisions of the Fields Bill are perhaps more troubling, at least from a
political standpoint. The bill would preempt existing state securities laws, essentially
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more fundamental securities reform in two important respects. First,
the Act would virtually eliminate the prospectus delivery requirement,
imposing an obligation to deliver the prospectus only when requested
by the prospective investor.41 Second, and more significantly for pur-
poses of future securities reform, the bill would grant the Commission
general exemptive authority-the power to exempt certain classes of
securities and issuers from the requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
completely." A grant of exemptive power to the Commission under
nullifying the effect of those laws in all 50 states and mandating enforcement of
securities actions under federal law only. Id. at *4; see Anita Raghavan et al., GOP
Securities Law Plan May Tilt Balance of Power, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1995, at C1.
Another provision of the bill would relax current margin rules and extend the ability
of brokers to borrow against their margin stock, allowing borrowing not only from
banks but from any lender. Fields Testimony, supra, at *4. Commission Chairman
Arthur Levitt expressed his reservations toward the Fields Bill, reiterating that "[als
we [the Commission] evaluate the legislation, our benchmark will continue to be the
protection of American investors." Id.
In contrast, Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), the ranking Democrat on the House
Subcommittee for Telecommunications and Finance, stated-
There are several provisions in H.R. 2131 which I am pleased to support, in-
cluding its effort to boost the capital raising abilities of small businesses and
the grant of additional exemptive authority to the SEC. I also support the
goal of eliminating duplicative and overlapping regulations which do not pro-
vide any additional protections to investors or to the market but which do
serve to increase costs.
Deregulating Capital Markets: Oversight Hearing on the Health of American Capital
Markets Before the Subcommittee on Telecomm. and Fin of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 104th Cong. (Nov. 14, 1995), available in 1995 WL 674871, at *7 (opening
statement of Edward J. Markey). Rep. Markey's position seems to indicate that biparti-
san support exists for the provisions of the Fields Bill most essential to implementing
a system of fully integrated disclosure, and possible later implementation of a company
registration model. Id. at *8, *11.
423. Fields Testimony, supra note 422, at *9. Rep. Fields observed that the pro-
spectus delivery requirements were both too inefficient and outmoded, and did not
favor efficient capital-raising efforts:
The prospectus delivery rules are as antiquated as anything in the federal se-
curities laws. We now require investors to receive a preliminary prospectus,
then a nearly identical final prospectus, neither of which the investor usually
reads, prior to purchasing a new issue of securities. The costs associated
with prospectus delivery are significant, and are particularly burdensome to
smaller capitalized companies. We want to facilitate on-line delivery of infor-
mation to investors. We also want the information investors receive to be
useful to them. I firmly believe that often less is more. We can improve this
area for our firms and for our investors.
Id.
424. Id. at *8-*9. Rep. Fields noted that an express grant of exemptive authority
an enacted H.R. 2131 could pave the way for modernization of the dual
system of securities disclosure and ultimately lead to full integration of
disclosure under a system of company registration.
F. SEC Advisory Committee on Capital Formation
In February 1995, the Commission created the Advisory Committee
on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes, chaired by Steven
M.H. Wallman.425 The Commission formed the committee for the pur-
pose of "assist[ing] the Commission in evaluating the efficiency and
effectiveness of the... disclosure requirements relating to public offer-
ings of securities, secondary market trading and corporate reporting,
and in identifying and developing means to minimize costs imposed by
current regulatory programs .... 4
The Committee indicated it enthusiastically supports the idea of com-
pany registration, and several members of the Committee have ex-
pressed their personal support for company registration reform.427
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt noted that the "rules for capital formation
in the twentieth century may not be adequate to meet the needs of
investors in the twenty-first century," and joined many on the Advisory
Committee in calling for implementation of the company registration
system.
428
Chairman Wallman joined the call for investigation of company regis-
tration, but expressed concern over "whether adequate protections
against fraud can be maintained absent a transaction-based registration
process and the attendant liability scheme."4' Still, even Wallman ad-
mitted that the benefits provided to investors by the 1933 Act's fraud
prevention must be weighed against the burdens imposed by the Act
possibly "erect[ing] unnecessary obstacles to capital formation without
producing countervailing informational benefits for investors."' The
explicit support of company registration by members of the
Commission's own Advisory Board suggests that the 1933 Act has be-
come burdensome and unwieldy in its old age, and signifies that the
"will enable the SEC to respond more quickly to market changes that render regula-
tion unnecessary. We hope that exemptive authority will prove to be a useful tool to
promote further examination of the securities laws by the expert agency." Id. at *9.
425. Wallman, supra note 233, at 2.
426. Id.
427. Inside the SEC: SEC Advisory Committee on Capital Formation Favors Com-
pany Registration, INSIGHTS, July 1995, at 25.
428. Wallman, supra note 233, at 3.
429. Id.
430. Id.
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time has come for American securities markets to move toward compa-
ny registration.
V. THE ADVISORY COMMiTTEE REPORT
The Advisory Committee was formed with the broad mandate:
[T]o assist the Commission in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the
regulatory process and the disclosure requirements relating to public offerings of
securities, secondary market trading and corporate reporting, and in identifying
and developing means to minimize costs imposed by current regulatory programs,
from the perspective of investors, issuers, the various market participants, and
other interested persons and regulatory authorities."
Almost immediately, the Advisory Committee began analyzing the costs
and benefits of transactional disclosure under the 1933 Act for issuers
subject to the continuous reporting requirements of the 1934 Act.' The
Advisory Committee concluded that while the 1933 Act is "well suited for
companies that are engaging in an initial public offering," it often produc-
es "uncertainties, complexities, and anomalies... that unduly burden
capital formation for issuers without providing significant offsetting ben-
efits to investors, and.., deny needed investor protections."' Accord-
ingly, the Committee announced that "the time has come for a fundamen-
tal conceptual change in the scheme of regulation governing public offer-
ings" and recommended that the Commission adopt a company regis-
tration system to replace the aging system of transactional disclosure
under the 1933 Act.'
The Advisory Committee Report consists of two main sections: the
justifications and expected benefits of the proposed company registration
system,' and the structure of the proposed system.' The Report
represents the Commission's strongest statement to date that the 1933
Act is not only obsolete with respect to companies reporting under the
1934 Act, but that it should be replaced with a fundamentally new system
of disclosure based on a modem securities market.4
7
431. See SEcuRImEs AND EXCH. COMM'N, CHARTER OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CAPITAL FORMATION AND REGULATORY PRO-
CESSES, reprinted in ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1.
432. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at i-ui.
433. Id. at 1-2.
434. Id. at 2-3.
435. See id. at 1-21, app. A at 1-67.
436. See id, at 21-48, app. B at 1-105.
437. See, e.g., id. at 5 ("The Commission's ultimate goal should be the implementa-
A. Why Company Registration? The Proposed System's Rationale and
Impact
1. Problems With the Current System
The Advisory Committee observed that the current system of transac-
tional disclosure often imposes substantial economic and logistical bur-
dens on widely traded issuers, with little or no disclosure benefits to a
market already adequately informed about the issuer through its 1934 Act
reports.' One of these logistical burdens is issuers' inherent uncertain-
ty about what kinds of solicitation are permissible during registration of
an issue, and what kinds will constitute gun-jumping in violation of sec-
tion 5.439 This uncertainty forces issuers to make a critical
choice-abstain from solicitation and risk dooming the offering for lack
of interest, or engage in the limited solicitation needed to make the offer-
ing a success but run the risk of section 5 liability-with a wrong choice
creating irreparable delay in the offering.' °
Second, issuers face substantial direct and indirect expenses associat-
ed with public offerings under the current system." These costs in-
clude underwriter spread, federal and state filing fees, attorney and ac-
countant fees, printing fees, and discounts in the offered securities from
market price. 2 Transaction costs are generally higher for non-shelf is-
suers, partly because of heavier regulatory burdens which force a more
time-consuming due diligence review and also market discounts resulting
from delays in going to market.' These delays often result from issuer
uncertainty regarding when the Commission will complete review of the
registration statement and declare the statement effective." Again,
tion of a system of company registration that totally replaces the current
transactional registration concept for all reporting companies.") (emphasis added).
438. Id. at 6.
439. Id.; see supra notes 268-99 and accompanying text (discussing the
Commission's inconsistency regarding gun-jumping).
440. ADVISORY COMMItEE REPORr, supra note 1, at 6-7. The delay is especially dam-
aging to shelf registrants, who often choose shelf registration to exploit short-lived
market opportunities. Id. at 7.
441. Id. at 9, app. A at 2-7; see supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the direct and indirect expenses associated with modem equity offerings).
442. ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 2-3.
443. Id. app. A at 5-7, 8-17.
444. Id. app. A at 8-17. Due to the Commission's "selective review" process, issuers
generally do not know if the Commission will review their registration statements,
how long the review will take, or whether the Commission will require the issuer to
make substantial changes to the registration statement before declaring it effective.
Id. app. A at 8-12. This problem becomes especially important for shelf issuers, who
often choose shelf registration to take advantage of a market window that will only
be open for a short time. Id. app. A at 8.
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non-shelf issuers bear the greater burden in regulatory delay: from 1994
to 1995, repeat non-shelf issuers using Forms SB-2, S-1, S-2, S-11, or S-3
had an average of 24.996 of their registration statements reviewed, com-
pared with 16% of all Form S-3 shelf registration statements re-
viewed." 5
Third, issuers have been forced to deal with hypertechnical and incon-
sistent Commission interpretations of key 1933 Act concepts, often push-
ing them toward offshore offerings and other alternative capital raising
techniques designed to evade section 5 requirements."' Not only do is-
suers incur the cost of an illiquidity discount when engaging in private
placements and other equity offering alternatives, but investors incur the
cost of less protection from section 5, as more of these alternative offer-
ings circumvent section 5 disclosure requirements."7 Moreover, as issu-
ers make increasing use of offshore offerings, private placements, and
alternative equity raising instruments, the lines between private and pub-
lic offerings, as well as domestic and foreign offerings, become less
clear.'
Fourth, tremendous growth in the secondary markets versus the prima-
ry issuance markets have made the 1934 Act, not the 1933 Act, the main
statutory protection for investors."9 Because 1934 Act reports currently
provide far less in-depth disclosure than do 1933 Act registration state-
ments and prospectuses, and thus "tend to be taken less seriously," the
Advisory Committee feels that issuers need to pay more attention to
these reports, both to improve their quality and their currency.'
Finally, perhaps the greatest burden on issuers in the current system
has been compliance with due diligence under section 11, especially in
the context of shelf registration.411 Underwriters and other issuer agents
445. Id. app. A at 10-12 & tbl. 2. The figures used are from the Commission's Divi-
sion of Corporate Finance and include only firm commitment underwriting offerings.
Id. app. A at 11 tbl. 2.
446. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPoRTr, supma note 1, at 10-13, app. A at 27-40; see supra
notes 257-311 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's hypertechnicality in
construing Securities Acts concepts); notes 324-33 and accompanying text (discussing
alternative equity instruments such as offshore offerings, PIPEs, and AB exchange of-
fers).
447. ADVISORY COMMIEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
448. Id. at 11, app. A at 48-57.
449. Id. at 11-13, app. A at 57; see supra notes 238-56 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing recent changes in the primary and secondary capital markets).
450. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. A at 58-59.
451. Id. app. A at 61-66.
complain that they cannot possibly perform traditional due diligence
within the short shelf registration time frame.42 These gatekeepers of-
ten are not involved in filing the issuer's 1934 Act reports, yet must certi-
fy within a short period of time prior to a shelf offering that all of the
issuer's 1934 Act reports are accurate and contain no material misstate-
ments or omissions.4' This difficulty stems in part from the current
system's emphasis on gatekeeping in the primary issuance markets, -a
transactional emphasis that makes little sense in a system gearing more
toward the secondary markets and continuous disclosure.'
Other problems with the current transactional disclosure system pri-
marily burden the market by promoting inefficient or incomplete disclo-
sure, which prevents the market from quickly absorbing the information
and reflecting the security's optimal price.4" Prospectus delivery, de-
signed to disclose important offering and issuer information to the inves-
tor, has failed to accomplish the same purposes with respect to the mar-
ket.4' First, because an issuer has no freedom to design the prospectus
to address the specific needs of potential investors, the system forces
issuers to conform to a statutory standard which results in disclosure
with less real benefits and more investor confusion.457 Second, under
Rule 424(b)(2),4" issuers may file the prospectus supplement, which
must be delivered to investors in a shelf offering and disclose certain
material information concerning the offering and security price, with the
Commission as late as two business days after the offering is complet-
ed.4' Thus, while buyers in the shelf issuance have up-to-date informa-
tion concerning the issuer and the offering, traders in the secondary
market do not enjoy this informational advantage, and the market cannot
absorb this current information quickly enough to establish an optimal,
efficient price for the security.'
452. Id. app. A at 62-63.
453. Id. app. A at 63.
454. Id. app. A at 63-66.
455. Id. at 7-9.
456. Id. at 7-8, app. A at 40-44.
457. Id. at 7, app. A at 40-44. The Commission's attempt to promote "plain English"
disclosure in prospectuses is a clear indication of the Committee's concern about
investors receiving truly useful disclosure instead of government-mandated language
and "legalese." See id. at 20-21, 26; SECURITIES AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON DISLcOsuRE SIMPLIFICATION 21-24 (last visited March 5, 1996)
<http://www.sec.gov/news/spstindx/htm>; see also Securities and Exch. Comm'n, Bell
Atlantic and Nynex File First Plain English Disclosure Documents With SEC (last
modified Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov/news/plaineng.htm>.
458. 17 C.F.R. § 230.424(b)(2) (1996).
459. Id.; ADVISORY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8, app. B at 13 & n.12.
460. Id. at 7-8.
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2. Benefits of Company Registration
The Advisory Committee identified several potential benefits to issuers,
investors, and the regulatory process under its proposed company regis-
tration system."' First, issuers would enjoy the reduced transactional
costs and greater flexibility associated with a streamlined registration
process." Once a reporting company has filed a new Form C-i-a pro-
posed one-time company registration statement similar to the Form S-3
shelf registration statement-all of its securities would be registered and
could be sold in any amount without filing a registration statement or
awaiting Committee review.' Registration of all of the issuer's securi-
ties at once would arguably eliminate the troublesome market overhang
problem experienced by some shelf issuers, while allowing issuers to pay
registration fees on a simple "pay-as-you-go" basis.' Issuers may also
avoid the significant drawbacks of private placements, including resale
restrictions, illiquidity discounts, purchaser and fungibility restrictions,
and the vagaries of integration, under Rule 144A.' Finally, the new
461. Id. at 16-17, app. A at 24-26.
462. Id. at 17.
463. Id. at 17, app. A at 26.
464. Id. at 17, app. A at 24-26; see supra note 233-34 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the problem of overhang in shelf registrations). The Advisory Committee ap-
parently felt that because overhang is ostensibly due to investor fears that later sales
of the unallocated securities registered in the shelf registration statement will dilute
ownership share, overhang will disappear in company registration because no fixed
"allocated" amount exists. See ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
Nonetheless, it is far from clear that company registration will allay the investors'
fears; indeed, investors now may fear the same dilution in issuer sales of
"unallocated" registered shares.
465. ADVISORY COMmrFTE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18, app. B at 50. The Committee
pointed out that a full company registration system would "eliminat[e] the notion of
exempt private placements and restricted securities altogether" by making all sales of
Form C-i-registered securities by the issuer or its affiliates subject to 1933 Act
protections and liabilities (Le., section 11). Id. app. B at 50. Company registration
would eliminate most restrictions on affiliate resales because the registration would
subject issuers to full 1933 Act liability for these and any other sales traceable to the
company registration statement. Id. app. B at 51. Thus, no prospectus delivery would
be required from affiliates--the 1934 Act protections against fraud, insider trading,
and short-swing trading would disclose any possible changes to issuer control or its
outstanding securities. Id. app. B at 54-55. Still, affiliates would have the option in
the pilot system of (1) selling their securities within the pilot system under Form C-
1, or (2) remaining outside the system and complying with the restrictions of Rule
144. Id. app. B at 57-59.
For this reason, only a limited number of control persons would be subject to
system would release issuers from the traditionally strict prospectus re-
quirements of section 5, and give them more freedom to make a pro-
spectus an understandable informational and marketing tool designed
specifically for its investors and written in plain English.4"
According to the Advisory Committee, investors would also enjoy sev-
eral benefits from company registration. Company registration should
enhance investor protection by consolidating disclosure requirements and
applying the single liability standard of section 11 to issuers' periodic
reports."7 By making section 11 the standard to which issuers must
conform in their 1934 Act reports, the Advisory Committee predicted that
the quality and accuracy of disclosure will improve across the board as a
result of (1) greater due diligence efforts by issuers and gatekeepers, and
(2) specific direction in the Rules as to what actions constitute such due
diligence.'8
Finally, the Advisory Committee argued that company registration will
streamline and simplify the regulatory system. Previous Commission
hypertechnicality and inconsistency in its interpretations of section 5
terms such as gun-jumping, private placement, and solicitation would
disappear as the system no longer strives to reconcile transactional and
continuous disclosure with modem realities.' Disclosure from issuers
will not only be of a higher quality, but also a more current source of
information for market investors in general, as well as the specific indi-
vidual offerees and purchasers in a particular offering.47 °
resale restrictions and registration requirements under company registration: (1) the
CEO, (2) inside directors, (3) directors representing controlling shareholders, (4) 20%
shareholders, (5) 10% shareholders with the right to select one or more directors for
the board, and (6) any other person "who can be presumed to be in a position to
exercise control." Id. app. B at 55-56. This last category creates only a rebuttable
presumption of control, and its membership is fact-sensitive, although it may include
those persons able "to obtain the signatures necessary to complete the registration
process." Id. app. B at 55-56 & n.61; see Cohen, supra note 31, at 1393. This limited
definition of "control person" applies only to the determination of who is subject to
resale restrictions and registration requirements under the company registration sys-
tem, and does not alter the existing definition applicable to joint and several control
person liability under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra
note 1, app. B at 56; see 15 U.S.C. § 77o, § 78t(a) (1994).
466. ADVISORY COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17, 20-21.
467. Id. at 18-20.
468. Id. at 19-20.
469. Id. at 18.
470. Id. at 18-19.
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B. How Will it Work? The Structure of the Proposed System of
Company Registration
1. Initial Setup of the Pilot System
The Advisory Committee proposes a "pilot" voluntary company regis-
tration system open to seasoned issuers with (1) a completed IPO, (2) a
public float of at least $75 million, (3) at least two years of continuous
reports under the 1934 Act, and (4) one or more classes of securities
listed either on NASDAQ's National Market System or a national ex-
change.47 ' The pilot would allow foreign issuers to participate so long
471. Id. at 32, app. B at 41. It should be noted that the eligibility requirements for
the pilot system build on the prerequisites for shelf registration, but add the addition-
al requirement that the issuer be listed on a national exchange and extend the re-
porting history requirement from one year to two. Id. app. B at 41, 44-45; see 17
C.F.R. § 239.13(a)(3), (b)(1) (1996) (codifying General Instructions L(A)(3), L(B)(1) to
Form S-3).
The pilot system is designed to admit only larger, more seasoned issuers with a
substantial reporting history, and the Committee estimates that about 3096 of compa-
nies reporting under the 1934 Act would qualify. ADVISORY CoMMnrEE REPORT, supra
note 1, app. B at 46. If the pilot program is successful, however, the Committee
envisions a full company registration system open to all publicly held companies,
particularly smaller companies not currently eligible to use shelf registration. Id. app.
B at 43-46. The company registration system would not be available to any issuer
engaging in an IPO, because of the Committee's view that more rigorous disclosure is
necessary and appropriate to educate the public about the issuer and to familiarize
the issuer with its new disclosure obligations as a public company. Id. app. B at 41-
42. The system would be unavailable even though the issuer may currently be subject
to 1934 Act reporting requirements because of its asset level and number of equity
holders, or because the security is traded on an exchange. Id. app. B at 41-43, 59;
see 15 U.S.C. § 781(b), (g) (1994) (requiring issuers traded on an exchange or with a
certain level of assets to file reports under the 1934 Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1
(1996) (requiring issuers with $10 million in assets and 500 or more equity holders to
file reports under the 1934 Act). To this end, the Committee also proposes redefining
an "IPO" as "the first registered offering of securities by an issuer." ADVISORY CoMMrr-
TEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 43. This would mean that public offerings by
previously reporting companies who had since gone private would be considered
IPOs, and the offering could not be made within the new company registration sys-
tem. Id. app. B at 42 n.47. Finally, any securities "not valued on the basis of the
issuing company's business and financial information, such as asset-backed or special
purpose issues, would not be eligible for the system," though securities partially
based on such information or the issuer's performance (e.g., structured and tracking
securities) could qualify for company registration with certain required disclosure
rules. Id. app. B at 59; see Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 20 n.25 (suggesting
exclusion of asset-backed, structured, and other "complex" securities from any new
company registration system).
as they made periodic disclosure similar to that required of domestic
issuers under the 1934 Act.4"
Qualifying issuers can choose between two forms of company registra-
tion: full company registration or modified company registration.4" In
modified company registration, issuers can continue to use registration
exemptions and offshore offerings outside section 5 while participating
in the company registration pilot.474 These exempted offerings would
remain outside the company registration system and be subject to the
standard conditions and liability rules normally associated with these
transactions.476 In full company registration, issuances would take place
completely within the company registration system, thus all of the
issuer's securities would be subject to the same protections and liabilities
as registered issuances under the 1933 Act.476 As a result, all securities
registered under the new system would be freely marketable.477
The pilot would allow issuers to opt out of the company registration if
they choose by withdrawing their Form C-is, but these issuers could not
472. ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPO-rT, supra note 1, app. B at 48. The Committee sug-
gested that foreign issuers may not be good test candidates for the pilot system,
however, because foreign disclosure rules often do not require quarterly reports and
differ in other material ways from American 1934 Act reporting. Id.
473. Id. at 33-35, app. B at 59-65.
474. Id. at 34-35, app. B at 59-65. Issuers adopting modified company registration
would have the choice of (1) preserving their registration exemptions and continuing
to make sales outside the company registration system pursuant to the requirements
of those exemptions, or (2) waiving the registration exemptions and conducting such
transactions under the company registration system. Id. app. B at 63.
475. Id. at 34-35, app. B at 59-65.
476. Id. at 33-34, app. B at 63-64. Issuers opting for full company registration, how-
ever, could choose to issue nonconvertible debt securities either within or outside the
new pilot system. Id. app. B at 51 n.56, 60. The new system would subject securities
distributed in offshore offerings to all 1933 Act protections and liabilities once re-en-
tering the United States, and require issuers to register on Form C-I their "reasonable
estimate of the likely flowback into the United States." Id. app. B at 60-61. This
would eliminate many of the inconsistencies of protection and liability in Regulation
S practice; all securities flowing back into the U.S. from offshore transactions would
be subject to the same liability standard as if they had been issued domestically. Id.
app. B at 61. Full company registration would preserve an unusual form of quasi-
private placement (a limited placement), whereby an issuer unable to make the re-
quired company registration disclosures (e.g., due to confidentiality concerns for busi-
ness purposes or required reports not completed in time for the offering) may sell its
securities to accredited investors on the condition that those investors hold the secu-
rities until the issuer files the required public disclosures. Id. app. B at 65-66. Issuers
would still have to make all otherwise-required disclosures to the accredited inves-
tors, and could freely market the securities once the required information was filed.
Id. app. B at 66. At all times, the full protections of the 1933 Act would apply to
securities issued in a limited placement Id. app. B at 65-66.
477. Id. app. B at 64.
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re-enter the system for two years.4" A similar two-year ineligibility peri-
od would apply to any issuer failing to meet the eligibility or mandatory
disclosure requirements of the system, including any issuer failing to
keep its periodic reports current by the start of each new offering. 4
2. Public Offerings in the New System
a. The Form C-1 and additional required filings
A participating company in the pilot company registration system
would register its securities in a Form C-1 registration statement
"disclos[ing] its plans to sell securities from time to time in the indefinite
future on a company-registered basis."' The Form C-1 would in effect
register the company, not merely a certain number of its securities."'
The issuer would pay a small registration fee upon submission of the C-1,
then pay a full fee upon each public offering of its securities based on
the number of securities offered for sale in the offering (the pay-as-you-
go approach).' Filing the C-i, along with continuous 1934 Act report-
ing, would register all of the issuer's securities simultaneously, based on
its public file of 1933 Act disclosures, and allow the issuer to sell any of
its company-registered securities at any time without further registration
or staff review.' All securities registered under the C-1 would be freely
tradable and subject to the liabilities and remedies of the 1933 Act, most
notably section 11.'
The pilot system would require issuers to make certain filings upon
each issuance depending on whether the issuance was either a de mini-
mis equity/non-convertible debt offering, or a non-de minimis equity of-
fering.' In a de minimis equity offering' or non-convertible debt of-
478. Id. at 33, app. B at 43.
479. Id. at 33, app. B at 46-47.
480. Id. at 22, app. B at 7.
481. Id. at 22, app. B at 7-8.
482. Id. at 22, app. B at 8. This solves the potential problem of the issuer having
to pay an unreasonably large fee upon initial registration, based on the current sec-
tion 6(b) formula of calculating the registration fee as "one twenty-ninth of one per
centum of the maximum aggregate price at which such securities are proposed to be
offered." 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b) (1994); see Coffee, supra note 238, at B7 (discussing
problems with, and alternatives to, the current section 6(b) formula).
483. ADVISORY COMMrTrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23, app. B at 7-10.
484. Id. at 23, app. B at 9. An issuer could even convert its restricted securities
into tradable company-registered securities by registering those securities for resale
on Form C-1. Id. app. B at 8-9.
485. Id. at 23-24, app. B at 11-14.
fering, the issuer would have to file either a Form 8-K or a prospectus
supplement by the selling date detailing offering-specific information
(transactional disclosure)" ' and any material revisions of the issuer's
1934 Act public disclosure fie (updating disclosure).' In a non-de mi-
nimis equity offering, the pilot system would require an issuer to file an
8-K (not a prospectus supplement) by the selling date, which would pro-
vide the same transactional and updating disclosures.' The Committee
designed this latter 8-K filing requirement to incorporate by reference
information about larger issuances into the Form C-1 registration
statement, thereby making available the full range of section 11
protections and remedies not available for information incorporated by
reference into the prospectus only via a prospectus supplement.4
b. Prospectus delivery
Prospectus delivery in the pilot system would fall into three tiers of
differing delivery requirements, based on the amount of voting equity
offered. 9' In routine transactions,4 issuers could either deliver a for-
mal prospectus or incorporate their 1934 Act filings (including transac-
486. A de minimus equity offering is an offering amounting to 396 or less of the
security's public float made over a three-business-day period. Id. at 23.
487. This type of disclosure refers broadly to information particular to the present
offering not yet appearing in the issuers 1934 Act public disclosure file, sufficient to
provide notice of the offering and other material transaction disclosure. Id. at 23-24,
app. B at 11-14. Though the Committee declined to recommend specific "line-item"
transactional disclosure, it noted that such disclosure would approximate what regula-
tion S-K requires today. Id. app. B at 10. For an example of such disclosure in the
current system, see id. app. B at 10 n.8 (giving financing example).
488. Id. at 23-24, app. B at 12-13. The Committee suggests the three percent de
minimis/non-de nnimis dividing line as an example, and it is not clear that the sug-
gested three percent figure will be determinative of a de minimis offering in the
ultimate pilot system. Id. at 23. Normally, transactional disclosure would need to be
fied by the date of the first securities sale, while updating disclosure would need to
be filed prior to the first sale, perhaps one to three business days before. Id. at 24.
The Committee feels that an issuer should disclose an updating disclosure a sufficient
amount of time before the offering to allow the market to digest the new information
and adjust the issuer's security price accordingly. Id. at 24, app. B at 11-14. If the
issuer chooses to file a prospectus supplement, the supplement would not be incorpo-
rated into the Form C-1 and thus not be subject to section 11 liability. Id. app. B at
12-13, 63-64.
489. Id. at 23-24, app. B at 11-12.
490. Id. at 24. Reports under the 1934 Act that the issuer incorporated by reference
into the prospectus through a prospectus supplement, however, would still be subject
to section 12(2) liability. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994).
491. ADVISORY COMMrrrE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28, app. B at 14-29.
492. A routine transaction is an "offering[] of voting equity amounting to (less than]
2096 ... of the existing public float of the security." Id. at 28.
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tional and updating filings) by reference into distributed documents, such
as general selling documents or the confirmation of sale serving as one
prospectus.' In nonroutine transactions, 4 4 issuers must deliver a for-
mal prospectus to unaccredited investors that contains transactional and
updating disclosures not yet in the issuer's 1934 Act public disclosure
file.4  Finally, in extraordinary transactions, 4 issuers must also deliv-
493. Id. at 28-29, app. B at 17-18. The Committee estimates that 7096 of current firm
commitment offerings of equity would qualify as routine under the pilot system. Id. at
28 n.23. This prospectus delivery requirement corresponds to most de minimis offer-
ings mentioned above. See supra notes 48-90 and accompanying text (describing de
minimis offering filing requirements). If the issuer chooses to incorporate its 1934 Act
filings by reference, the information in those filings need not also appear in the pro-
spectus documents ADVISORY COMMrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. This is different
from the shelf registration system, in which the issuer must physically deliver the
transactional disclosure to the investor. Id, at 29, app. B at 18-19. The Committee
believes that allowing issuers to designate their selling materials as the prospectus
will allow issuers to tailor the prospectus content to the needs of the individual in-
vestor, making disclosure more accessible (i.e., in plain English), while including only
information that is most useful and relevant to the investor. Id. at 25-26, app. B at
14-19; see also supru note 457 (describing the Commission's efforts to encourage
plain English disclosure). Information in selling materials would be deemed a pro-
spectus, but would not be incorporated by reference into the Form C-1, thereby
avoiding section 11 liability, but not section 12(2) liability. ADVISORY COMMmrEE RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 27. Indeed, the Committee suggests that the ultimate goal of a
fully developed company registration system may be elimination of the prospectus
requirement altogether. Id. app. B at 19 ("Because market forces reasonably can be
relied upon to ensure the delivery of the appropriate level of information (at least in
the case of seasoned issuers), a substantial argument could be made that there is no
need to mandate prospectus delivery in any instance.") (emphasis added).
494. A nonroutine transaction is an "offering[] of voting equity amounting to 20% or
more of existing public float of the security." ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 29-30.
495. Id. at 29-30, app. B at 20-24. "Those offerings, because of their size, are likely
to alter substantially the information previously provided to the market and to involve
significant oral and written selling efforts." Id. app. B at 20. The Committee suggest-
ed that the Commission may decide to merge this second tier with routine transac-
tions and simply require prospectus delivery for extraordinary transactions. Id. at 28;
see infrz note 496 (defining extraordinary transaction). The issuer would need to file
with the Commission prior to the offering, but the Commission would not review the
prospectus, as in shelf registration. ADVISORY COMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app.
B at 21. The Committee would also require in both nonroutine and extraordinary
transactions that the prospectus be delivered to the investor "prior to the time the
investor determines to purchase," to give the investor enough time to consider the
information and make an informed investing decision. Id. app. B at 22. The formal
prospectus would be required to contain the same amount of disclosure required
under current S-3 shelf offering prospectuses, along with any information needed to
er a formal prospectus to unaccredited investors with transactional and
updating disclosures and that prospectus would be subject to Commis-
sion review prior to the offering.49 '
c. Disclosure enhancements
In addition to filing and prospectus delivery requirements, the compa-
ny registration program would also require issuers to provide certain
additional disclosures (disclosure enhancements) not currently required
by the shelf registration system.4" The Commission would design these
disclosure enhancements to improve gatekeeper due diligence efforts
with respect to 1934 Act disclosures by improving the accuracy and re-
liability of the reports as they assume a more central role in the new
disclosure system.4"
First, an issuer would need to make "Top Management Certifications"
on every Form 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filed with the Comnnission, given in
the form of attestations by any two of four qualifying officers: the
issuer's chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief accounting
officer, or chief operating officer.' The two officers must certify in the
attestation attached to the filing that "they are not aware of any mislead-
ing disclosures or omissions" in the filing."' The Committee hoped that
this certification requirement would impress upon management their
responsibility to ensure the accuracy of the issuer's 1934 Act reports.'
Second, the issuer's management would need to produce a "Manage-
ment Report to Audit Committee," detailing the "procedures followed to
ensure the integrity of periodic and current reports and procedures insti-
tuted to avoid potential insider trading abuses."' The management
prevent the prospectus from being false or misleading, even if the information is
duplicated in 1934 Act reports. Id. app. B at 25-26.
496. An extraordinary transaction is a "securit[y] transaction[I that fundamentally
change[s] the nature of the company [such as] . . . offerings of voting equity amount-
ing to 4096 or more of the existing public float of the security." ADVISORY CoMmrr
REPORr, supra note 1, at 30.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 36-39, app. B at 67-85.
499. Id. at 36-37, app. B at 67-70. The Committee recognized the popular conception
that present 1934 Act disclosures "still tend to be taken far less seriously, and to be
of lower quality, than those historically provided, and still aspired to, under the [Se-
curities) Act." Id. app. B at 67 n.71 (quoting Milton H. Cohen, The Integrated Disclo-
sure System-Uqfinished Business, 40 BUS. LAw. 987, 992 (1985)).
500. Id. at 37, app. B at 74-76.
501. Id. at 37.
502. Id. at 37, app. B at 74-75. Importantly, the certification creates no independent
liability for the officer-signatories; rather, the Committee expects that the act of cer-
tification alone will psychologically "refocus" management on enhancing the quality of
the issuer's 1934 Act reports. Id. app. B at 74-75.
503. Id. at 37, app. B at 76-79. The Committee feels that disclosure of these proce-
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would deliver this Report to the issuer's audit or disclosure commit-
tee' and file it with the Commission as part of the issuer's Form 10-
K 505
Third, "Form 8-K Enhancements" would require the issuer to file a
Form 8-K notifying the market of certain changes to its securities, man-
agement, and 1934 Act reports within five business days of the
change.' These changes would consist of (1) "material modifications
to the rights of security holders,"' (2) "resignation or removal of any
of the top five executive officers," (3) "defaults of senior securities, " '
(4) "sales of a significant percentage of the company's outstanding
stock,"' and (5) any occasion when the "issuer [is] advised by [an]
independent auditor that reliance on [an] audit report included in previ-
ous filings is no longer permissible because of auditor concerns over its
report."
5 10
Fourth, "Risk Factors" and risk factor analysis would be required in
the issuer's Form 10-Ks in the same manner as presently required in 1933
Act filings.
5
"
dures will lead issuers to compare their practices with those of other issuers and
arrive at a set of "best disclosure practices." Id. app. B at 77.
504. See infra notes 543-49 and accompanying text (describing the proposed issuer
disclosure committee as a due diligence mechanism in the company registration sys-
tem).
505. ADVISORY COMMiTTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 37-38, app. B at 76-79. The Re-
port would need to be resubmitted in a future 10-K only if these safeguard proce-
dures changed. Id. at 38.
506. Id. at 38, app. B at 80-82. Under the current system, an issuer only needs to
file a Form 8-K within 15 calendar days of a reportable event, See SEC Form 8-K
General Instruction B(1).
507. This disclosure is already required as part of the. Form 10-Q. See Form 10-Q,
Part If, Item 2. The Committee believes that these disclosures may be "stale" by the
time the issuer's 10-Q is publicly available, and that current disclosure of the modifi-
cations will correct the frequent inequity of only institutional investors receiving this
information directly from the issuer. ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app.
B at 81.
508. This disclosure is also required on the 10-Q. See Item 3 of Form 10-Q.
509. The sales may be either of common shares, convertible warrants, or the equity
equivalents of convertible warrants. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
The Committee does not answer the question of how large a sale must be to be a
significant percentage of the issuer's stock.
510. Id. at 38, app. B at 80-82. These concerns may address the issuer's ability to
function after the audit report or the issuer's request for a "second opinion" on a
covered audit period by another auditor. Id. app. B at 82.
511. Id. at 38, app. B at 82-85; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.503, .506 (1996) (requiring dis-
Finally, the Commission would urge other "voluntary measures" to be
taken by the issuer to enhance its due diligence efforts, including regular
audits of its interim financial reports and material events occurring after
financial statement dates, auditor and counsel opinion letters for offer-
ings, and formation of a disclosure committee or audit subcommittee to
review 1934 Act disclosures prior to filing."
4. Liability
a. Issuer liability
Under the pilot system, all protections and remedies available to inves-
tors under the 1933 Act would apply to securities issued under the Form
C-1 registration statement."3 Thus, section 11 liability would attach to
all securities traceable to a false or misleading company registration
statement.1 4 Also, section 12(2) liability would attach to selling materi-
als serving as the prospectus.5"5
The import of adopting section 11 liability for an issuer's continuing
1934 Act disclosures cannot be ignored. Under section 11, issuers and
their agents could escape liability for materially false or misleading dis-
closures in the Form C-I, or the issuer's 1934 Act filings incorporated by
reference into the C-i, if they could show that "they engaged in a reason-
able investigation and had reasonable grounds to believe in the accuracy
of the disclosure."5"5 This is commonly known as the due diligence de-
fense." ' Section 12(2) provides a narrower damages remedy for securi-
closure of issuer risk factors and possible dilution in current equity holdings).
512. ADVISORY CoMMrTrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-39, app. B at 36-39, 87-94.
513. Id. at 39-40.
514. Id. at 39-40, app. B at 51, 87-94. Section 11 imposes strict liability on the issu-
er, its directors and officers, and other agents such as underwriters and accountants
for "materially false or misleading statements" or omissions in the registration state-
ment 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994); ADVISORY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at
87; see supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text (discussing section 11 liability).
The Committee felt that a single liability standard for all disclosures made under the
company registration system would correct present deficiencies in disclosure liability,
such as the lack of section 11 protection for prospectus supplements issued in shelf
offerings, offerings pursuant to registration exemptions, and flowback from offshore
offerings. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 39; see Elimination of Pricing
Amendments and Revision of Prospectus Filing Procedures, Securities Act Release No.
6672, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 84,038 at 88,302 (Oct.
27, 1986) (presenting for comment "proposals intended to simplify the filing require-
ments").
515. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 40; see supra notes 122-28 and
accompanying text (discussing section 12 liability under the 1933 Act).
516. ADVISORY COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 87.
517. See supra note 120 (discussing due diligence defense under section 11).
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ties purchasers against sellers under the Form C-I, "unless the sellers
can show that they were not negligent in failing to discover false and
misleading statements.""' Thus, the pilot system would often subject
the issuer and its agents to section 11 liability in many transactions now
subject only to section 12(2) liability, if at all. 19
Securities sold by the issuer to a third party who immediately turns
around and sells the securities to the public on the issuer's behalf would
be deemed sold by the issuer, and section 11 would apply."n To temper
this type of broad underwriter liability, the Committee recommended
creating a safe harbor for company-registered offerings, by limiting the
definition of underwriter in section 2(11) of the 1933 Act to "persons
engaged in the business of a broker-dealer, whether or not registered as
such (including banks not required to register as a broker-dealer), who
participate in the distribution of securities by an issuer or affiliate. " ' 2
This narrower definition of underwriter would confine the strict liability
provisions of section 11 and accompanying due diligence obligations to
only the named underwriters conducting the offering.'
b. Due diligence and the role of gatekeepers
According to the Committee, one of the key goals of the new company
registration system would be to strengthen and clarify the gatekeeping
role played by underwriters and other agents of the issuer in an attempt
518. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2); ADVISORY ComMrTrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 87-
88; see supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing section 12(2) liability
under the 1933 Act).
519. ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 91-94. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Gustafson v. AUoyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995), seems to
suggest that private placements escape both section 11 and section 12(2) liability,
subject only to the requirements of Rule 10b-5. See id. at 1073-74. Thus, issuers par-
ticipating in the full company registration system may incur substantially higher liabil-
ity levels than previously enjoyed in exempt offerings. ADVISORY COMMrITEE REPORT,
supra note 1, app. B at 93-94.
520. ADVISORY COMMITEE REPORt, supra note 1, at 51.
521. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1994).
522. ADvISORY COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 51-52; see American
Council of Life Insurance, supra note 290, at 78,692 (stating that insurance companies
and pension and employee benefit plans are not within the definition of underwriter).
523. ADVISORY COMMIrTEE REPoRT, supra note 1, app. B at 52. The narrower defini-
tion also would allow resales of an acquiring company's securities by the acquired
company's affiliates and insiders after the acquisition, reversing the current rule. Id.
app. B at 53; see 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1996) (defining underwriter).
to improve the quality and reliability of 1934 Act reports.' Because
section 11 would apply to all of the issuer's continuous filings in the
company registration system, gatekeepers such as underwriters and audi-
tors would have an increased incentive to verify the accuracy of these re-
ports.' Accordingly, the Committee would recommend amending Rule
176 to include additional factors gatekeepers may consider in determin-
ing the level of review they must undertake to satisfy due diligence,
based on the mandatory and voluntary disclosure enhancements imple-
mented in the pilot.52 Further, the Committee would allow gatekeepers
such as underwriters and outside directors to rely on the efforts of other
gatekeepers in determining what actions would satisfy their own due
diligence.52 7 These added considerations would facilitate gatekeepers'
reasonable care and reasonable investigation obligations under the 1933
Act, while providing a clear and certain standard under which gatekeep-
ers could structure their actions.s
The various gatekeepers within the company registration system would
fulfill differing, but complementary, roles in monitoring issuers' disclo-
sures. The Commission would still be an important gatekeeper, but its
focus would shift from review of sporadic, 1933 Act registrations to
broader oversight of the continuous disclosure system.'2 As mentioned
before, the Commission would not review the Form C-1 or offering-spe-
cific transactional disclosure given to the investor (i.e., prospec-
tus/confirmation of sale or selling materials) prior to each offering of
securities in the new system.' ° Instead, the Commission would focus
on selective review of 1934 Act reports to ensure the integrity of the
disclosures relied upon most by investors under company registra-
tion."'
524. ADvISoRY COMMrr=E REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-41, app. B at 29-40; see supra
notes 408-12 and accompanying text (describing the role of gatekeepers in the current
system).
525. ADVIsORY COMMrrE REPORT, supra note 1, at 41, app. B at 33-40.
526. Id. app. B at 33-40; see supra notes 480-90 and accompanying text (discussing
the proposed disclosure enhancements of the pilot system).
527. ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 97-99.
528. Id. at 41-42. Notably, the Committee refused to recommend adoption of an
express safe harbor from liability encompassing these factors, and quoted Escott v.
BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), for the idea that '"[ilt
is impossible to lay down a rigid rule suitable for every case defining the extent to
which such verification must go. It is a question of degree, a matter of judgment in
each case.'" ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 97 (quoting Escott,
283 F. Supp. at 697).
529. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 29-33, 95.
530. Id. app. B at 29; see supm note 483 and accompanying text.
531. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supnz note 1, app. B at 30-31, 95-96. Review of
the issuer's offering-specific transactional disclosures could occur as part of a more
general review of the issuer's periodic reports, but would not be a condition prece
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Underwriters occupy perhaps the most prominent gatekeeper role
under the current system, and the Committee's proposed system strives
to preserve that role. Responding to the concerns of many underwriters
that current shelf offerings afford too little time to complete an adequate
due diligence inquiry into the accuracy and integrity of issuer disclo-
sures, the Commission adopted the 8-K filing requirement before each
public offering to provide a "focal point" for underwriter due diligence
duties.' The Committee emphasized that strengthened due diligence
by underwriters and outside directors "is critical to maintaining and in-
creasing investor protection" under the pilot system; thus, instead of
scaling back the due diligence obligation altogether, the Commission
gave clearer direction as to what actions constitute acceptable due dili-
gence procedures, helping underwriters "limit their exposure by reducing
the opportunity for material misstatements to be disseminated to the
public. " ' The Committee felt that the recommended additional Rule
176 factors and the permissible reliance on other gatekeepers' efforts
would help reduce underwriters' fears of added liability in the new sys-
tem and improve the quality of issuer disclosures overall.'
dent to equity offerings. Id. The Committee would recommend that potential Commis-
sion review be preserved, however, for extraordinary transactions, distributions which
would not be able to proceed until the Form 8-K was formally declared effective by
the Commission. Id. app. B at 31-32; see supra note 496 and accompanying text (de-
tailing extraordinary transactions and their disclosure requirements).
532. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPOr, supra note 1, app. B at 33-35. The Committee re-
jected the "speed bump" approach to underwriter due diligence, wherein some delay
would be required (e.g., three days) between the issuer hiring the underwriters and
the offering in order to give the underwriters time to adequately review all the
issuer's transactional and updating disclosures. Id. The Committee argued that this
approach "artificially disrupts the process," and that issuers and their underwriters
should decide how much time would be enough to conduct due diligence. Id. app. B
at 33-34. Moreover, the Committee points out that underwriters would have time to
review issuer disclosures prior to the offering, during the time the issuer files any
updating disclosure and delivers any formal prospectus required as a result of the
offering size. Id. app. B at 35.
533. Id. app. B at 96-97.
534. Id. app. B at 96-100. The Committee laid out the specific factors underwriters
should consider in determining the required level of due diligence: (1) Senior Manage-
ment Certifications, (2) Management's Report to the Audit Committee, (3) reviews of
issuer disclosures by auditors and other independent gatekeepers, (4) opinions of the
underwriter's own analysts who "have followed the issuer for a significant period of
time," (5) any review conducted by the issuer's disclosure committee, and (6) the
absolute and relative size of the offering versus the size of the issuer. Id, app. B at
100-01; see supra notes 500-02 and accompanying text (discussing Top Management
Certifications), and notes 503-05 (discussing Management Report to the Audit Commit-
Auditors play another gatekeeping role both in the current system and
in the proposed company registration piloL As in shelf registration,
auditors must give consent to issuers to use their audit reports before
each offering, and auditors must file that consent with the Commission
by the offering date.w Before giving consent, the auditor undertakes a
review of the issuer's annual financial statements to determine whether
any material changes that would necessitate changes to the auditor's
prior report have occurred since the issuer filed the statements. 7 An-
nual audits of the issuer's financial statements provide an added certifica-
tion that information about the issuer and its business is current and
accurate, thereby fortifying the reliability of the issuer's continuous dis-
closure.' Moreover, underwriters often work closely with auditors in
review of financial disclosures in the prospectus, in order to ensure that
the information is accurate and not misleading.m
Finally, outside directors are important gatekeepers in the pilot sys-
tem, working to ensure that all disclosure leaving the issuer is accurate
and not misleading.T M The proposed disclosure committee, discussed
below, is a way to position outside directors as the first line of gatekeep-
ers and enable the issuer to work more closely with its auditors and
underwriters to ensure disclosure integrity."M According to the Com-
mittee, outside directors on the disclosure committee (or audit commit-
tee, if assigned the task of reviewing issuer disclosures) should be per-
mitted to base their due diligence procedures on the Committee's pro-
posed disclosure enhancements, as well as the efforts of other gatekeep-
ers involved in the offering.M 2
tee).
535. ADVISORY COMMrTEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 35-40.
536. Id. app. B at 35-36. This consent may apply to all C-I offerings until the issuer
files new audited financial statements. Id. app. B at 36.
537. Id, app. B at 40. The Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 37, an ac-
counting guideline designed to standardize auditor reviews, outlines this review. Id.
538. Id. app. B at 37-40.
539. Id. app. B at 40. These accounting reviews are governed by SAS No. 72, and
cover issuer compliance with relevant disclosure regulations in audited financial state-
ments and schedules, as well as other unaudited financial information contained in
the prospectus. Id.
540. Id. app. B at 102-04.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 103-04. The Committee detailed three factors outside directors should
consider in determining what level of due diligence the new system requires: (1)
Senior Management Certifications, (2) Management Report to the Audit Committee,
and (3) reviews of issuer disclosures by auditors and other independent gatekeepers.
Id. app. B at 104; see supra notes 500-02 (discussing Top Management Certifications);
supra notes 503-05 (discussing Management Report to the Audit Committee).
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c. The disclosure committee
As a part of an issuer's general due diligence procedures, the Commit-
tee recommended creation of a disclosure committee comprised of out-
side directors who would review the accuracy and integrity of the
issuer's 1934 Act disclosures under the new system.' The issuer's di-
rectors could then safely rely on the committee's investigation into the
accuracy of the issuer's 1934 Act disclosures if (1) the delegation of due
diligence is reasonable,' (2) the delegating directors "reasonably be-
lieve that the disclosure committee's procedures are adequate and were
being performed" based on regular oversight,' and (3) "the delegating
directors reasonably believe that the disclosure is not materially false or
misleading."' If these factors are met, delegating directors can shield
themselves from section 11 liability.5
7
The Committee believed that issuer adoption of the disclosure commit-
tee program would direct and simplify due diligence efforts, as well as
enhance the overall quality of 1934 Act disclosures made to the mar-
ket.' Through a coordinated effort with other gatekeepers (i.e., under-
writers, accountants, and counsel), the disclosure committee would give
issuer agents, as well as the issuer itself, greater protection from liability
under the company registration system's expanded section 11 stan-
dard.649
543. ADVISORY COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 1, app. B at 43-48. Alternatively, the
issuer could assign the duty of such review to the audit committee. Id. app. B at 43-
44.
544. "[Tlhe delegating directors [must] reasonably believe that the member(s) of the
disclosure committee are sufficiently knowledgeable and capable of discharging due
diligence obligations on behalf of the outside directors (if necessary, with the assis-
tance of their professional advisers) and are provided with adequate resources to
conduct the requisite investigation .... " Id. at 44.
545. This oversight "would entail requiring the disclosure committee to report peri-
odically to the Board on the procedures followed to ensure the integrity of the dis-
closure." Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 4445. This defense would mimic the current state law "reliance defense."
See Coffee, supra note 238, at B7 (arguing for adoption of a reliance defense through
use of disclosure committees). Thus, the Committee believed that following these
factors would also protect delegating directors from most state liability. See ADVISORY
COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 45 n.33 (noting that Delaware and Pennsylvania
law allow creation of committees to discharge directors' fiduciary duties).
548. ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
549. Id. at 46-48.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE ADVISORY COMMr'rEE REPORT
There are numerous potential advantages of the proposed company
registration system. Under the system, the hypertechnical interpretations
of integration, general solicitation, and restricted securities, with all of
their concomitant problems in holding periods, and the troublesome
public-private distinction, might cease to exist.'e The system would al-
so obviate many disadvantages of the registration exemptions under the
1933 Act.sI The new system would not subject investors to holding pe-
riods or prohibit them from otherwise transferring newly issued securi-
ties, thus promoting the marketability of such stock and, consequently,
its attractiveness to potential investors.'e Company registration would
eliminate prohibitions against the solicitation and advertisement of secu-
rities, so long as company registration requirements were met.'o Fi-
nally, the system has the potential to greatly enhance the quality and
integrity of 1934 Act reporting across the capital markets, as well as the
gatekeeping functions of underwriters, outside directors, and other
professionals.' In sum, capital formation should become easier for
companies under the company registration system, and this could lead to
more efficient and productive capital markets.'s
Serious questions remain, however, as to whether the company regis-
tration system proposed by the Committee would attract enough issuers
to be viable, even in the pilot stage. First, and perhaps most importantly,
issuers opting into either the full or modified company registration pilot
would be taking on significantly more liability than they are subject to
under the current system. The in terrorem remedy of section 11 would
now apply not only to a/ of the issuer's securities issued under the Form
C-1, but also to all of the information contained in the issuer's 10-Qs, 10-
Ks, and 8-Ks.' This added liability has led commentators to suggest
550. Id. at 18, app. B at 50-51 (discussing benefits to registered security transac-
tions); see Walman, supra note 233, at 2-3 (examining effects of the proposed com-
pany registration model).
551. See ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPoRr, supm note 1, at 18, app. B at 50-51.
552. Id. app. B at 54-55.
553. Id. at 18.
554. Id. at 18-20.
555. Id. at 16-17, app. A at 24-26.
556. Id. app. B at 91. Moreover, it is unclear that further "clarification" of the due
diligence defense will comfort issuers entering into potential strict liability for all of
their periodic reports. As its name indicates, the due diligence defense is precisely
that a defense. It will not prevent investors from filing lawsuits against issuers for
alleged false or misleading statements in the issuer's 1934 Act Forms, a disincentive
to enter the system in itself. See id, app. B at 89 ("According to several commenters,
there are few reported cases actually decided on Section 11 grounds, but in meetings
with industry representatives the Committee staff was informed that a significant
number of potential Section 11 claims are settled without actions being instituted or
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that under the new system, plaintiffs could bring lawsuits for false or
misleading disclosures in the issuer's 1934 Act filings without having to
prove either scienter or negligence. 7 Though the proposed system pur-
ports to be a model of deregulation, "it contains as many ideas for
reregulation as deregulation. " '
This substantial increase in potential issuer liability raises another
problem with the proposed system: do the incentives for issuers to opt
into the pilot outweigh the added liability and disclosure costs?' If
not, the new system may have trouble attracting any participants. The
Supreme Court's decision in Gustafson v. AUoyd Co.' indicates a trend
toward deregulation, suggesting that if issuers remain with the present
system a little longer, they may get even greater deregulation of the reg-
istration exemptions and further scaled-back liability resale restrictions
than under the company registration system." In other words, why
should the issuers simply have their cake when soon they will be able to
eat it too?
A potential solution to both the incentive and liability problems would
be the adoption of a lesser standard of liability for 1934 Act filings and
transactional disclosures incorporated by reference into the Form C-1,
such as a form of section 12(2) negligence liability as suggested by
Bancroft.' This negligence standard could be adopted in place of sec-
tion 11 for transactional and updating disclosures made in the pilot sys-
tem, and could incorporate a formal safe harbor reliance defense based
on reasonable reliance on outside directors and independent profession-
als.' Thus, given a choice between issuing freely tradable shares gov-
erned by a negligence standard under a company registration system, or
without reported decisions.").
557. Roberta S. Karmel, Deregulation: Real or Alleged?, N.Y. L.J., June 20, 1996, at
7.
558. Id.
559. See id.
560. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995); see supra notes 334-43 (discussing the Gustqson case).
561. Id. at 1073 (holding that the term "prospectus" under the 1933 Act refers to
public, not private offerings). For example, a company registration system would sub-
ject distributions qualifying as exempt private placements under the current system
(thus subject only to section 12(2) liability) to section 11 strict liability. See ADVISORY
CoMMrrrEE REPoRT, supra note 1, app. B at 91-94.
562. See Bancroft, supra note 15, at 15; see also supra notes 371-78 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Bancroft's proposed negligence standard in company registra-
tion).
563. See Bancroft, supra note 15, at 15; see also supra note 374 and accompanying
text (discussing Bancroft's suggested safe harbor).
issuing restricted shares governed by Rule lOb-5 under the current sys-
tem, issuers might have legitimate marketing incentives to choose the
former.'
Another problem with the proposed pilot is whether the Commission
will agree to implement it and whether the Commission can fully imple-
ment the program by administrative rulemaking alone. Underwriters
strongly opposed the adoption of shelf registration for fear that it would
reduce or eliminate issuers' need for underwriters altogether and forced
the Commission to insert a provision in Rule 415 requiring the use of an
underwriter.' Though that situation never happened, underwriters will
again make up one of the strongest constituencies in opposition to the
proposed pilot, unless, as in shelf registration, the Commission includes
an underwriter requirement in the pilot.
Moreover, the Commission's authority to implement a full company
registration system is unclear. Company registration represents a clear
departure from the express dictates of section 5 of the 1933 Act, at least
insofar as it would allow for modification or elimination of the prospec-
tus and registration statement requirements.' Thus, significant dis-
putes may arise over the power of the Commission to implement fea-
tures of such a system through rulemaking, especially when doing so
would either implicitly or directly conflict with the express language of
the 1933 Act. 7 On the other hand, creating a company registration sys-
564. Bancroft, supra note 15, at 15. Bancroft suggests that investors would help the
issuer make the choice by their preference, and that demand for marketable securi-
ties and the added costs of a negligence standard might be low enough not to dis-
courage the issuer from opting into company registration. Id.
565. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4)(iii) (1996); see also Coffee, supra note 7, at 1171
("With some justification, a cynic could describe this requirement as a full-employ-
ment act for underwriters, who otherwise were prepared to fight the adoption of
shelf registration vehemently."). Indeed, one commentator suggested that underwriters
will inevitably become obsolete, even in the current system, because of the rise of
institutional investors. See Langevoort, supra note 182, at 750-63.
566. See Coffee, supra note 238, at B4, B7. Section 5(a) of the 1933 Act makes it
unlawful to sell or deliver a security "unless a registration statement is in effect as
to [the] security." 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1994). Section 5(b) makes it unlawful to deliver
a security "unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the require-
ments of subsection (a) of section 77j of this title." I& § 77e(b)(2). Section 5(c)
makes it unlawful to offer to sell or buy any security "unless a registration statement
has been filed as to such security." Id. § 77e(c). Thus, outside the scheme of express
registration exemptions, the statutory language mandates at least some form of "regis-
tration statement" and "prospectus."
567. See Coffee, supra note 238, at B4, B7. Coffee noted that "[aidministrative im-
plementation of a company registration system would be politically easier but legally
more problematic because it poses some close questions about the SEC's statutory
authority." Id. at B4. As the Securities Act currently is structured, the Commission
may not escape the confines of the registration and prospectus concepts in Sections
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tern solely through legislation which restructures or partially repeals
section 5 could prove too controversial, too impractical, or simply impos-
sible.' Thus, a complete solution to the woes of the current system
would almost definitely require action both from the Commission and
Congress.'
This combined legislative and administrative implementation may be as
simple as Congress granting the Commission authority to exempt quali-
fied companies from registration under the 1933 Act, similar to the au-
thority granted to the Commission under section 303 of the American
Law Institute's model Federal Securities Code.7 Section 303 of the
Code permits the Commission to exempt "any person, security, transac-
tion, or any class of persons, securities, or transactions, from any or all
the provisions of this Code."57' Congress could adopt a similar rule with
respect to the 1933 Act, giving the Commission the power to bypass the
Act through rulemaking and essentially effect an administrative repeal of
section 5 of the 1933 Act."7 Alternatively, Congress could enact the
Federal Securities Code as written, effectively replacing the 1933 Act in
favor of a fully unified system of securities disclosure, though such a
step is less probable given political practicalities.5"
Even in the absence of Congressional action, the Commission could
implement some of the features of a company registration system
through administrative rulemaking.574 The 1933 Act allows the Commis-
sion to change the registration and prospectus delivery requirements "if
it determines that the requirement of such omitted information 'is inap-
plicable to such class and that disclosure fully adequate for the protec-
5 and 10 of the 1933 Act. Id.
568. See id. at B4.
569.. Id.
570. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 21; see AMERICAN LAW INST., FED. SEC.
CODE § 303 (1980). The Federal Securities Code outlines a unified system of disclo-
sure based essentially on 1934 Act disclosure and company registration. Id. § 402-406
(1980). Under the Code, issuers would register securities through an "offering state-
ment" filed with the Commission containing material information and 1934 Act-type
disclosures incorporated by reference. Id. §502(a)(c) (1980). Issuers would then deliv-
er a prospectus to investors after the confirmation of sale. Id. § 504 (1980).
571. FED. SEC. CODE § 303.
572. See Coffee, supra note 4, at B4.
573. Id. at B7. Congress failed to enact the Federal Securities Code once before, in
1980, despite popular support both from the Commission and the academic commu-
nity. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1145-46. This experience suggests that meaningful legis-
lative securities reform may be difficult or impossible to achieve. See id.
574. See Coffee, supra note 4, at B4.
tion of investors is otherwise required to be included within the registra-
tion statement.'"5 75 It is unclear, however, whether these provisions
would permit the kinds of wholesale administrative changes involved in
company registration.
VII. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Advisory Committee Report, Professor Coffee noted that
"[rieports of the death of the '33 Act can be exaggerated," and cited the
limitations of section 5 prospectus delivery, the section 6 proscription
against registering multiple securities, and section 11 liability.' As
these limitations recede or disappear in the face of the Commission's
proposed company registration system, it may be time to write the obitu-
ary for section 5.
The company registration system proposed by the Advisory Committee
has the potential to provide investors and corporations with the best of
both worlds: investors would still be able to obtain the vital information
they need concerning new issues to prevent fraud and misinformation
from leading them into overly speculative or high risk investments, while
companies would be able to acquire needed capital without undue regu-
latory burdens or delays. Indeed, the interests of the two groups largely
coincide; prospective investors have a valid interest in seeing the corpo-
ration they wish to invest in obtain other investors' capital quickly and
efficiently, thereby allowing the company to increase profits and returns
to the new investors.
On the other hand, the proposed system imposes potentially substan-
tial liability costs on issuers and gatekeepers. The section 11 strict liabili-
ty standard would arguably subject issuers to more lawsuits based on
1934 Act reporting, notwithstanding issuer and gatekeeper attempts to
perform due diligence. To the extent that the threat of a lawsuit is signif-
icant to issuers, few issuers may choose to enter the new system and
subject themselves to more litigation, opting instead to stay with the
current system of registration exemptions and resale restrictions.
575. Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 18-19 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (1994)).
Section 7 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1994), details the information required to
be disclosed in the registration statement, but section 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a), "spe-
cifically places the registration statement within the purview of the Commission's
rulemaldng authority." Backman & Kim, supra note 202, at 19 n.7. Moreover, section
10(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(4) (1994), gives the Commission express authority to re-
move any information from the prospectus which is not "necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or the protection of investors." Backman & Kim, supra note 202,
at 19.
576. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1159.
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As Milton Cohen noted, securities regulation would have looked much
different if the Exchange Act had been enacted before the Securities Act
or if the two Acts had been formulated initially as a single statute.'
Perhaps in such a world, American securities laws would have balanced
the best of both worlds: full and fair disclosure to the individual investor,
and an efficient system of capital formation for securities issuers. Unfor-
tunately, that is not the world which evolved from the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. Despite our enlight-
ened hindsight in 1997, we should not forget that in post-crash 1933 the
outlines of an efficient securities system were, at best, seen through a
dark glass.
Still, modem securities terrain differs fundamentally from that sur-
veyed by the architects of the 1933 Act, now featuring intense competi-
tion for capital dollars, the dominance of savvy institutional investors,
and the Information Superhighway. The Securities Act of 1933 was sim-
ply not designed for this world. Instead, the Commission should incorpo-
rate the Act's goal of full and fair disclosure into a new generation of dis-
closure system, one which eliminates the inefficiency and
hypertechnicality needed to sustain the old system, and replaces them
with unified, continuous disclosure designed to make all material infor-
mation about a company and its securities available to an investor for
the least cost. If and when a company registration system is adopted, the
Securities Act of 1933, at least as it has been known for over sixty years,
will be dead. Experience with the integrated disclosure system and uni-
versal shelf registration, however, should instruct us that the system is
going in the right direction. Company registration is the next logical step.
MICHAEL MCDONOUGH
577. Cohen, supra note 31, at 1341.

